American writer Thomas Friedman expressed his extreme caution about Israel continuing its ground invasion of Gaza for fear that it will sink into its mire forever, that all of the “ills” of the Strip will become under its responsibility, and that it will be forced to manage its population, which numbers more than two million people, who are suffering under the weight of a humanitarian crisis.

What is worse in light of a scenario like this - from the writer’s point of view - is that it will tarnish the reputation of the Israeli army, which has been seeking to restore the Israelis’ confidence in it.

He first urged the Israeli political and military leadership to meditate on the adage attributed to Confucius: “Before you embark on a journey of revenge, dig two graves, one for your enemy and the other for yourself.”

Friedman pointed out - in his weekly article in the New York Times - that Israel's declared goal of the invasion was to recover its detained prisoners and to destroy the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and its infrastructure once and for all.

He said that the reason he was cautious about the invasion - to get rid of Hamas forever - was not because of any sympathy for this Islamist movement, but rather “deep concern that Israel is acting out of blind rage” in order to achieve the unachievable goal of “wiping out Hamas from the face of Earth" and without having a plan for what comes next, warning that persisting in this may mean drowning in the mud of Gaza forever.

The writer compared the military operation that Israel is now carrying out in the Gaza Strip in retaliation for the Hamas attack on it on October 7, and the two wars launched by the United States against Afghanistan and Iraq following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the cities of New York and Washington, “for which we paid dearly.” .

He suggested that Israel follow the example of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which established a “red cell” or “red team,” which is a group of intelligence employees outside the direct military or political chain of command, which is primarily tasked with examining war plans and objectives for Iraq and Afghanistan and subjecting it to the test by proposing contradictory alternatives to the achievable goals of restoring American security and deterrence.

Friedman explained that his proposal is not limited to establishing a red team on how to deal with Hamas in Gaza, but also establishing a “blue team” to criticize the actions of its red counterpart. He added that Israel needs to hold more lively internal discussions because it "has clearly been thrust into a war with multiple and contradictory goals."

In the face of the impasse that Israel faces in transferring its ground war from northern Gaza to its south, Friedman advises the Israeli Red Team to adopt a “hard-line” alternative through which Israel calls for a permanent ceasefire, followed by a direct withdrawal of all its military forces from Gaza on the condition that Hamas returns all the prisoners to it. It has remaining civilians and soldiers, and all its dead, without getting any Palestinian prisoners in return.

The American writer considered this alternative a “clean deal,” noting that Israel reserves the right to bring senior Hamas leaders who planned the October 7 “massacre” to justice in the future.

Confucius “Before you embark on a journey of revenge, dig two graves, one for your enemy and the other for yourself.”

5 advantages

Friedman identified five advantages that his proposals could bring to Israel through the Red Team: The first is that all pressures aimed at a ceasefire to spare civilians in Gaza from further death and destruction will fall on Hamas, not on Israel. The latter will thus ensure that Hamas will not obtain “any major victory” from this war.

Secondly, the Red Team will respond to the complaints of some - and perhaps many - in Israel that the invasion did not achieve its declared goal, which will mean a victory for Hamas. The response will be that that goal - to begin with - was not realistic, especially with the unwillingness of the right-wing Israeli government to work with the “more moderate” Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to create an alternative to Hamas that runs the Gaza Strip.

Third, the hard-line alternative that the Red Team would adopt would create the same pattern of deterrence for Hamas that was created by the devastating Israeli bombing of pro-Hezbollah communities in the southern suburbs of Beirut in the 2006 war. Friedman said that the party’s Secretary General, Hassan Nasrallah, “did not dare” to provoke a wide-scale war. The domain has been with Israel ever since.

The fourth advantage - according to the writer - is that among the biggest strategic benefits that may result from Israel’s exit from Gaza, in exchange for a ceasefire under international monitoring, is that it can devote most of its attention to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

Fifthly, the Red Team can claim that there is an antidote within Israel that allows it to recover and resume its project of normalizing relations with its Arab neighbors and establishing a stable relationship with the more moderate Palestinian leadership in the West Bank. In Friedman's opinion, Israel will not be able to achieve this unless its Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is removed from power.

Blue team

As for the Blue Team - which the American writer proposes - it will wonder what Israel will do if the Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar, refuses not only to accept a ceasefire, but also to remove 6,000 Palestinians and over from Israeli prisons, declaring his willingness to pay the price for that if Western public opinion stands up to them. The result is that Israel will remain stuck in the mud of Gaza.

This team will say that it has a better idea, which is to lower the level of Israel's war goals, and to declare that its army's goal is not to wipe Hamas off the face of the earth, but rather to significantly reduce its combat ability.

Instead of that goal, the Blue Team announces that Israel will withdraw from Gaza, and establish a zone and forward posts one mile deep within the border with the Strip, to ensure that its border settlements are not subjected to a ground attack again similar to what happened on the seventh of last October.

Finally, this team will undertake the task of informing the Israeli leadership to "stop lying to itself and to the public." According to the article, the author adds that if Israel tries to keep Gaza completely, the latter will not only swallow up the leaders, but also that the politicians will raise enormous doubts in the minds of the general public about the army by providing them with an unachievable goal, as he put it.

In general, Israel needs this type of internal dialogue, where the red and blue teams can remind the leadership that there is no “ideal result” awaiting Israel in Gaza, because “taming” Gaza permanently always remains “a fantasy,” as Friedman believes in conclusion of the article.

Source: New York Times +Aljazeera