The Government and the Management of the Transitional Governance in the Gaza Strip

There is no doubt that the Palestinian government plays a significant role in managing aid and providing services to Palestinian citizens in the Gaza Strip within the recovery phase, through continuous coordination with partner UN and international organizations, donor countries, and entities, to implement coordinated and integrated interventions. This is done through the governmental operations room to rescue thousands of displaced families, secure alternative and safe shelters, and provide essential supplies to prevent the exacerbation of the humanitarian catastrophe suffered by the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.

Contributing to alleviating burdens in these circumstances, following the crime of genocide committed against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, is a sacred and undisputed mission; regardless of the size and type of contribution or participation in managing, organizing, or delivering these contributions, it is a commendable effort to sustain life for the residents. However, this effort remains temporary and relates to services that can be provided by various governmental and community entities. It does not address the future of the Gaza Strip by returning the Gaza Strip to the administration of the Palestinian government and ending institutional division.

This raises a fundamental question about the policy adopted by the government/National Authority for dealing with the transitional governance in the Gaza Strip, dealing with the bodies established under Security Council Resolution 2803 and the relationship with them, and planning for the post-transitional phase, which is supposed to end by the end of 2027. Planning here is proactive, aiming to impose a fait accompli in the Gaza Strip where the government takes the initiative and has the ability to establish future governing bodies to unify the West Bank and Gaza together, and prevent the Peace Council or any other body from continuing to manage the transitional governance, thereby making its extension impossible.

In my opinion, working in the broader context takes two paths; the first: relates to implementing the conditional issues in Security Council Resolution 2803 concerning the reform required from the Palestinian Authority, which itself made written promises and commitments therein, "until the Palestinian Authority satisfactorily completes its reform program as stated in various proposals, including President Trump's 2020 peace plan and the Saudi-French proposal, enabling it to regain control of Gaza safely and effectively."

And the second: adopting a governmental strategy to deal with the transitional administration, clarifying its interventions and utilizing Palestinian Authority employees present in the Gaza Strip, and the nature of the relationship based on coordination between the bodies of the Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank on one hand, and the National Committee for the Management of the Gaza Strip "Technocrat Committee" on the other; including the volume of information, records, spatial planning, international aid, and the reconstruction plan or plans to contribute to revitalizing life in the Gaza Strip and the required recovery, and enabling the government to systematically and effectively take over the governance of the Gaza Strip upon the end of the transitional phase, and preventing the possibility of extending this administration after the international mandate expires at the end of 2027.