Ideology in the Service of the State: What Did Gaza Reveal About Iran and Its Axis?

The war on Gaza, and the subsequent regional confrontations and American-Iranian negotiations, brought back an old question about the nature of the relationship between ideology and politics in the behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Does Iran govern with a transnational revolutionary doctrine that places Palestine and the “Axis of Resistance” at the core of its strategic decisions? Or is it a state that ultimately acts according to national interest calculations like other states? The reality is that the answer does not lie in one extreme, but in combining both. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran has not been merely a traditional nation-state, but it has also not been a purely ideological state. Over decades, it has succeeded in integrating doctrine with interest, transforming ideology into a tool of regional influence and a source of internal and external legitimacy. Within this framework, the Palestinian issue has occupied a central position in Iranian discourse. Palestine was not merely a solidarity issue; it became part of the regime's political and revolutionary identity, and a fundamental pillar in building the network of regional alliances later known as the “Axis of Resistance.” However, events of recent years have revealed that the centrality of Palestine in discourse does not necessarily mean it occupies the same position in the hierarchy of strategic priorities. During the war on Gaza, the Palestinian issue did not become a condition in Iranian negotiations with the United States, nor did stopping the war or ending the siege become part of the understandings Tehran sought. Although Gaza is presented as one of the most important battlefields with Israel, negotiations focused on issues directly related to Iran: sanctions, security, economy, and regime stability. Here arises another question that concerns not only Iran but also Hamas. The movement entered the battle of October 7 based on its own calculations, and perhaps on the assumption that the expansion of the confrontation would lead to broader involvement from axis parties under the slogan of “unity of fronts.” However, the course of the war revealed that each party has its own calculations, limits, and priorities. States, even when adopting a common ideological discourse, do not abandon the logic of national interest when making fateful decisions. From this perspective, the issue does not seem to be related only to the limits of Iran's commitment to its allies, but also to Hamas's understanding of the nature of the relationship between resistance movements and their supporting states. Political and military support does not necessarily mean unity of decision or unity of destiny, just as alliance does not negate the differences between the logic of a state and the logic of a movement. Perhaps one of the questions that will impose itself on the movement after the war is whether it will re-evaluate some of its previous bets on the role of allies and the limits of their intervention in moments of major confrontation. This problem becomes more complex when it comes to the Shiite forces within the axis. The relationship between these forces and Iran is not based solely on political or military interests; it intertwines doctrinal, sectarian, and political elements, which for some of these forces are linked to the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih and the role they grant to the Iranian leadership. However, the recent war showed that this ideological dimension, despite its importance, did not negate the fact that the final decision remains that of a state governed by calculations of power, survival, and Iranian national interest. While some of these forces view the relationship with Iran as both a political and ideological partnership, Tehran views the axis from a broader perspective related to Iranian state security and its strategic interests. Hence, the inherent tension between the logic of the state and the logic of ideology, and between the calculations of the center and the expectations of the periphery, emerges. This does not mean that Iran has abandoned Palestine or its allies, but rather that support for these allies has remained constrained by a ceiling that does not threaten the supreme interests of the Iranian state. When ideology aligns with interest, they move together; when there is a conflict between them, national interest takes precedence over everything else. Here appears one of the most important paradoxes within the axis itself. While Tehran treats its revolutionary slogans with a great deal of political pragmatism, some allied forces, especially those that derive their legitimacy from the ideological dimension, still treat these slogans as a fixed and unwavering commitment regardless of circumstances. Therefore, what is legitimate for Iran in terms of negotiation, settlements, and understandings seems illegitimate when it concerns its allies or their political environments. The recent war revealed that the so-called “Axis of Resistance” is not a homogeneous ideological bloc, but an unequal network of alliances led by a state with its own interests and national calculations. In this network, Iran reserves the right to make fateful decisions according to its national priorities, even when allies bear heavy costs in defense of the common project. The war on Gaza revealed that ideology in the Iranian project is not a substitute for the state, but one of its tools. Iran does not abandon its slogans, but it always reinterprets them to serve its strategic interests. This is where the strength and continuity of the Iranian project lie, on the one hand, and the source of constant tension between it and its allies, on the other. The closer the moment of truth, the clearer the difference between a state that sees ideology as a tool to serve its interests, and forces that see ideology as an end that takes precedence over other calculations. Perhaps the most important question after all that has happened remains: Have Iran's allies, especially Hamas after October 7, realized that “unity of fronts” does not necessarily mean unity of decision or unity of destiny? And that alliance, no matter how strong its ideological and military power, does not negate the fact that states ultimately act according to their national interests first and foremost?