A confused speech by an arrogant and troubled president

The speech delivered by President Trump last Wednesday morning, a "talk to the nation," saw the White House attempt to organize a campaign to explain and clarify what President Donald Trump said in his "talk to the nation." They sought to portray it as a responsible speech that explained the current situation to the public and provided important information to counter the campaign that included members of parliament, public figures, and media personnel. This campaign described the speech as ridiculous, trivial, empty, and a boring repetition of what he had previously said in dozens of statements and tweets. No one volunteered for a mission described as "suicidal" given the declining confidence in Trump's approach to managing a war he claims he won and ended, removing Iran from the map. He then says that Iran must open the Strait of Hormuz and that he is ready for a ceasefire with them. Then he says that he is not concerned with opening the Strait of Hormuz and that those concerned with it should open it themselves. Without embarrassment, as a head of state, he talks about his intention to commit war crimes by destroying civilian facilities that international law prohibits targeting during war. Chuck Schumer, the leader of the Democratic minority in the US Congress, described the speech as pathetic and the most scattered, declining, and trivial speech in the history of American presidents. He did not clearly define the goals of the war, nor the vision and mechanisms for how to exit it. Meanwhile, Democratic Congressman Chris Cullen described the speech as the most dangerous for America and the world. Democratic Congressman Chris Murphy said about this speech that the American president is detached from reality, with no clear plan, just unbalanced talk lacking seriousness. In his speech, US President Donald Trump said three contradictory things in his "talk to the nation." First, he delivered a speech paving the way for announcing the end of the war: "We executed what we planned, we destroyed, we ended the threat" — language to close a file and build an image of complete victory that allows for an exit without internal political cost. Second, he issued a threat that opens the door to escalation: "If Hormuz is not opened, we will open the gates of hell," language to continue and escalate the war. Third, he denied involvement: "We don't care about Hormuz and have no connection to it," language of detachment that allows for backing down from escalation if necessary. This is not verbal chaos, but three possible paths presented simultaneously. The first indication is that the speech does not stem from a completed decision, but from the absence of a decision. Because combining "we have accomplished and it's over" with "we will open the gates of hell" and "we have no connection to Hormuz" means that the White House has not made up its mind between exiting or escalating, and that the president keeps all doors open until the last moment. Therefore, contradiction becomes a tool. Trump also said that the path is not closed, but suspended until a deadline ending on Monday. Here, the deadline becomes the essence of the strategy: not a date for resolution, but a testing ground. What is being tested until Sunday evening? First, the ability of mediators to achieve a breakthrough. Will the mediation process succeed in producing a concrete step to de-escalate tension, exchange binding messages, or a negotiating framework that justifies settling for a victory speech and withdrawal? If a limited but buildable breakthrough is achieved, the option of "unilateral victory" becomes possible: declaring the end of the mission while keeping deterrence lines open. Second, the image of victory and strength domestically. Trump needs to test whether the media narrative (destruction figures, decisive strikes) is enough to convince the public that he has achieved the goal. If this image stabilizes, he can politically close the front without further escalation. But if the image appears shaky, it will require a dose of escalation to re-establish the impression. Third, the public's ability to bear the cost of prices. Including Hormuz in the speech is not a detail; it is a direct test of the American domestic (and allies') tolerance for rising energy prices in exchange for a sense of strength. If prices rise quickly and are accompanied by economic anxiety, the margin for escalation narrows. If the impact remains limited or tolerable, it expands. Fourth, the oil price's reaction to the escalation hypothesis. This is the most sensitive indicator. The threat to open the "gates of hell" is implicitly linked to the possibility of supply disruptions. If the market shows sharp jumps with every sign of escalation, then the barrel imposes a political ceiling on military decisions. If the reaction remains controlled, escalation becomes a less costly option. Three possibilities crystallize by the end of the deadline: exiting with a victory speech: solidifying the "mission accomplished" narrative and moving to a measured de-escalation, while keeping the threat as a deterrent tool. This option requires a mediating breakthrough, a convincing image of victory, and a relatively stable market, or going to escalation by activating the "gates of hell" language if mediators fail and the image of victory appears insufficient, assuming that the market cost is tolerable. Here, the threat turns into action. And the possibility of extending the deadline on Sunday eve: which is most consistent with the structure of the speech. Through a new extension that allows for continued testing: pressure without commitment, promises without resolution, and managing time instead of making a decision. It is clear from the series of dismissals taking place in the American administration, which included the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Attorney General, and other military and security leaders, that we are facing a moment of restructuring in the American decision-making apparatus, and it apparently includes leaders opposed to the continuation of the war on Iran. These dismissals and resignations at this time are closer to clearing the leadership path before a potential escalatory leap. As for a ground invasion, if it occurs, its goal will not be a final resolution but rather a redefinition of the rules of the game by force and imposing a new ceiling for negotiation under fire, although this option is unlikely due to its exorbitant military and economic costs and its major repercussions on oil and gas prices, financial markets, stock exchange prices, and the global economy.