With the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza... Palestinian Self-Rule Enters a New Era

The announcement of the establishment of the "National Committee for the Administration of Gaza," within the authority and powers of the "Peace Council," and even before it began its assigned tasks, was met with skepticism and belittlement from Palestinians, while being welcomed by Arabs and internationally. However, what cannot be denied is that the event finally allows for a silent end to the Oslo phase, which represented the last model of "non-sovereign" Palestinian self-governance during more than a century of administrative experiences under imperial or colonial rule. In the context of the global disorder overseen by Donald Trump, armed with the arrogance of excessive American military power, the Palestinian people are not the only or the strongest among the peoples and nations of the world who have been forced to submit to his will or mood. While Hamas reluctantly agreed to Trump's plan, the organization/authority expected to reap the return of its administration to the Strip and a seat at the decision-making table. Despite remaining players in the Palestinian political arena, one militarily defeated in Gaza and the other politically defeated in the West Bank, their influence no longer extends beyond the right of "non-objection" regarding the formation of the National Committee, nor does it reach the point of insisting on stopping the war of extermination or opening the vital Rafah crossing or basic life issues such as bringing in 200,000 mobile homes to relieve a distressed people. The Only Arena in the Country In light of the "compulsory or voluntary" Arab complicity with the sovereignty of the Peace Council and its senior and middle management mechanisms, and despite European and international reservations towards the Council, especially regarding its charter which is considered an abandonment of the UN system established 75 years ago, it is a project blessed by the UN Security Council, and the Peace Council and its mechanisms have become "the only arena in the country." The PLO realized early on the inevitability of imposing Trump's distorted formula on all principles, legitimacies, and norms regarding the Palestinian issue, and tried with limited success to introduce its own formulas, texts, and preferences into both Trump's original plan and the Security Council resolution and the composition of the National Committee. The organization has also maintained, and continues to maintain, close coordination with the Egyptian patron regarding internal political and security matters, and with Saudi Arabia regarding the promised and conditional political horizon in the UN resolution, of course. But the final path in the international plan to fulfill the Palestinian people's "desire" for "self-determination" - meaning not necessarily because it is a "right" - remains a mirage. As for Hamas, it is looking for any way out to survive humanly and politically, to reduce the widespread blame directed at it and the repercussions of the Al-Aqsa Flood - according to the majority of opinion poll results. While it announced its directives to its cadres to facilitate the transfer of government administrations to the supervision of the National Committee on the eve of its entry into the Strip to take over its duties, as well as its readiness to hand over its offensive weapons, some of the staunchest supporters of the resistance among analysts and thinkers have concluded that the Flood "not only did not achieve its declared goals, but brought about their opposite." Consequently, the two Palestinian parties, exhausted by two years of bloody war and an existential struggle with an exterminationist colonial project on the one hand, and their historical legitimacy on the other, are now ready to accept any formula that does not exclude them from the arena, despite the limited space available for demanding, or even complaining. The Peace Council... The New Reality I leave it to analysts and researchers from various parties to prepare the indictment against the Peace Council, which will certainly be long, and to hold accountable those responsible for both Oslo and the Al-Aqsa Flood. These are natural critical processes after the major transformations the region has witnessed. But it seems to me today that we must deal with the new reality, which has been accepted by all Palestinian and Arab parties, some under duress, for a temporary American mandate in a part of the occupied Palestinian territory, or rather for actual American sovereignty in the Gaza Strip replacing direct Israeli occupation and Israeli exclusivity in Palestinian affairs. This involves the transfer of the administration of the Strip from the authority of the "de facto government" to a new de facto government, under the supervision of the Peace Council and through professional Palestinians who do not belong to any political faction, even if they have their national past and their connections here and there, Palestinian and Arab. At the same time, the direct influence of the Palestinian Authority in the Strip, and in the occupied West Bank as well, is being removed or restricted, after it had worked for two years to prepare itself to fill the governance and security vacuum. This is the new reality, and the Palestinian people must realize how to deal with it and avoid its worst consequences, and perhaps even resist them intelligently and not just by condemnation. Indeed, the goals, laws, and structures of Oslo, or even those prevalent in the contemporary Palestinian revolution phase, no longer govern the scene. The greater Palestinian national struggle for freedom and independence faces a new dilemma of dispersion and human and material defeat, perhaps more difficult than what it faced in previous stages, but full of possibilities that were not present before this stage. Therefore, I seek here to reach an initial realistic understanding of what the experience of establishing, operating, and empowering the National Committee might bring, in light of the experiences of its predecessors and their lessons - if any - and also the size, level, and urgency of the Committee's responsibility stipulated by the Security Council resolution, and defined by supervising "civil service and administration" in the afflicted Strip. There are a number of important paradoxes and indications in the formation of this new administration, mandated by major global powers, and within the limits of its powers and capabilities, and in its legitimacy and the possibility of it deviating from the path of subservience to the existing mandatory/occupying power, which was the dominant feature of previous self-governance experiences. The Succession of Palestinian Self-Rule Eras Since the announcement of the Peace Council charter and the formation of the National Committee, pessimistic assessments have poured in, some due to Donald Trump taking the reins of managing Palestinian affairs, and the resulting extension of imperial-royal control over the fate of the issue, and some fearing a new transitional phase "supposedly for two years" that distances the issue further from sovereignty and justice, and renews and prolongs the suffering of a people exhausted by the struggle against colonialism and genocidal wars. What much of this criticism overlooks is that the new formula for Palestinian administrative self-governance that is crystallizing today does not differ much in terms of powers and expected role from the Palestinian Authority today in the West Bank, albeit under different names and political references. Therefore, the Gaza committee formula, as some portray it, is not different from what remains of the Authority's influence in the West Bank, where the PLO supervises and/or blesses both, while the organization retains the official international representative status of the Palestinian people. That is, the National Committee will not constitute an independent political entity as Trump, Kushner, and Netanyahu might like, just as the Palestinian Authority is not considered a political entity separate from the organization. Regardless of the legal debate about Palestinian legitimacy, it is important to acknowledge that this is not the first time the Palestinian people have been under the hegemony of an external, imperial, mandatory, occupying, colonial power, although we hope it will be the last. Without delving into a historical study here, we note that for more than a century, and even before the crystallization of a distinct Palestinian national identity, the Arab people in Palestine faced a series of forms of self-governance, more or less controlled by the center, and struggled in various forms and with the participation of all social classes, for liberation and then independence. Of course, the global balance of power allied with the Zionist movement has historically not been in favor of the Palestinian national right, and the latter sufficed with a policy of adaptation, survival, and preventing displacement, until the Arab-Jewish demographic balance in Palestine was achieved in 2025. During the Ottoman imperial rule, the provinces of Palestine were mainly administered by their people "politically affiliated with the Ottomans," and through local service, financial, judicial, and military administrations. Then, during 30 years of British Mandate, Arabs as well as Jews had their main place - but not leadership - in all administrations of the ruler ("High Commissioner"). The Mandatory Authority dealt with the political representatives of each party according to its policy favoring the Zionist project, i.e., through continuous cooperation with the Jewish Agency and representative Zionist institutions, and by excluding and banning the Arab Higher Committee. While the Palestinian people have been under direct Israeli rule since 1948 (inside Israel until today and since 1967 in the occupied territories), there was a "civil administration" affiliated with the Israeli army managing the affairs of the Palestinian people through 20,000 civil and service employees (who were later absorbed into the Authority's ministries). Then, with the Oslo framework after 1995, a "Palestinian Transitional Self-Government Authority" was established with functionally and geographically restricted powers (which remains the legal name stipulated despite its renaming as the "Palestinian National Authority"). With this long history and bitter experience with forms and succession of models of hostile external rule imposed on the Palestinian people, the constant has been the resistance of that people, in all arenas of confrontation with policies of extermination, deprivation, and exclusion, with a wide range of means according to the conditions and balances of each battle and front, sometimes advancing and sometimes retreating. This is perhaps the most important historical lesson in our assessment of the fate of the National Committee and the national project itself in the face of what is to come. Exaggerated Risks of Separation We also find some parties, especially those loyal to the PLO's vision, looking with reservation at the distinctive formula granted to the National Committee by its primary patron, the Peace Council, instead of the return of full administrative, security, and political national authority, a formula that it had planned and maneuvered with various parties to achieve. Nevertheless, the composition of the Committee does not show any political color hostile to the organization or to Fatah at all "and perhaps the opposite is true," including a wide range of experienced professional classes that were largely excluded from the structures of the Gaza and Ramallah authorities. Despite their non-factional affiliation, all the zealous people of the Gaza Strip know its people, their concerns, their communities, their traditions, and their politics better than others. It is certain that the most dangerous political challenge the Committee may face will come from the highest leadership levels: the Executive Council, composed of the President's Israel-loving group, through the High Representative Mladenov, who is more sympathetic to the Palestinian position. The Committee's task will be to present the preferred Palestinian vision, the reasonable Palestinian technical solution, and the authentic expertise available, in the face of a decision, plan, or instructions regarding humanitarian, economic, and internal security matters. This will require exceptional astuteness in dealing with the Israeli adversary, and persistent demands on the American patron to resort to logic and Palestinian rights, and to be armed with Arab patronage in this, in addition to accommodating the PLO so that it does not see the Committee as a separate or rebellious entity from it and from the national project. Above all, the Committee remains responsible not only to its conscience, but to two million Palestinians who need professional and honest administration in dealing with their catastrophe. Knowing that the Committee does not possess independent resources, institutions, or systems from those available under the slogan of "one authority, one law, one weapon." Perhaps the strongest argument the Committee can hold onto to resist the pressures it will be subjected to from the Executive Council of Gaza is that its legal status places it under the administration of the Peace Council, but that is only subject to two conditions. The first is that the Peace Council's mandate from the UN Security Council is the basis of the Committee's political "legitimacy," regardless of the internal regulations formulated by Trump's team as the Council's charter and its anticipated first decision. Then, the Security Council resolution links the establishment of the Committee to the Arab League, which worked to establish the Committee before Trump came to power. In addition, the Council must be reminded that its mission does not involve "regime change" in Palestine, and such a policy is not preferred by the Trump administration despite its imperial actions. The mission of the Council and its agencies is limited to helping Palestinians manage their affairs and rebuild what existed after the war within the framework of existing laws and Palestinian administrations, and not building a new, separate Palestinian Gazan system from the unity of the national project. Perhaps there was a valid reason before 2023 for fears that the isolated Gaza Strip under Hamas rule and besieged by Israel, after 15 years of a different path from the rest of the homeland, had become a separatist project, and that the geographical unity of the occupied territories was no longer inevitable. But those who warned of the "emirate in Gaza" project can now pause, as that project no longer exists if it ever actually existed, and Hamas no longer dreams of its detailed imaginary draft for after the defeat of the entity "the promise of the hereafter" published in 2021, especially after the 2.2 million Gazans of the hereafter and their daughters visited them for two years. Risks of Disaster Capitalism It is often overlooked that the "reconstruction" phase is many months away, in terms of the priorities of addressing the needs of relief and shelter phases, then the phase of starting to remove rubble and then rehabilitating and operating service facilities, all before the stages of economic recovery or permanent and comprehensive reconstruction. Despite this fact, the prevailing vision among Trump and those around him focuses on a real estate investment project of more than $115 billion (with a $55 billion return on investments over 10 years). Through this plan, the Gaza Strip will be acquired and "developed" real estate and economically according to a strange Western architectural design and an acquisitive investment doctrine where there is no place for humans or the Palestinian people to determine their destiny or draw their future map. Thus, we saw at the launch ceremony of the Peace Council the gap between the updated formula of "disaster capitalism" presented by Jared Kushner with shiny maps and images (that policy pursued by American and European money in many post-conflict situations, most notably Iraq and the list goes on), on the one hand, and the modest Palestinian humanitarian vision on the other, which was included in the speech of the Commissioner-General of the National Committee, Dr. Ali Shaath, focusing on the magnitude of the catastrophe that the Committee will do its best to alleviate its burden on the "distressed people of Gaza." This conflict over spatial and architectural planning visions and priorities is not new, but rather reflects a Palestinian professional and scientific pluralism in the issue of planning, and the self-ability to determine the future. In a recent Palestinian study, no less than six "authentic" Palestinian spatial plans were identified, covering among them all possible conceptions for the future Gaza Strip, and a number of them were completed before 2023. Since the war, many international institutes and companies have worked on formulating a similar number of plans for Palestine that reflect their interests, in addition to an additional number of "expert" international plans for the future governance of Gaza and Palestine in what is called "the day after." Therefore, as long as the Palestinian side "the organization, the committee, and the Arab patrons" insists on adopting their planning models and not the imaginary ones proposed by greedy and strange parties, the temptations of disaster capitalism can be confronted, especially since its success poses a great danger to Palestinian resources and to individual and collective Palestinian rights, and will not pass unnoticed. Perpetuating an Authoritarian Ideological Division Far from the Concerns of the People - Or the Unity of the Struggle Under the Umbrella of the State of Palestine? More than two years after the launch of the Israeli genocidal campaign that affected and continues to affect all Palestinians: people, land, identity, and belief, the majority of the Palestinian people expected, and were exhausted by repeated demands to end the division and achieve national unity politically, militarily, and governmentally. Unfortunately, all Palestinian parties failed, from Fatah and the PLO factions to Hamas and the resistance factions, passing through the bewildered leftist factions between the two poles, in addition to the financial and liberal elites who became accustomed to the division and adapted to it, and contributed intentionally or unintentionally to its perpetuation. Ultimately, the train of reunifying the organization or rehabilitating the authority for updated governance has passed, and with time, the experience of division will become a subject of historical study and a bitter memory for the majority of Gazans who look to the future and try to turn the page on the terrifying past as much as possible. All influential Palestinian parties must understand that the entitlement of the Peace Council and the Gaza Committee, and their loss of their previous legitimacy and the absence of unified Palestinian representation globally, constitute strong driving forces to reorient the compass of Palestinian political action to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase and to mobilize all elements of Palestinian power at home and in the diaspora. This requires courage in formulating new liberation agendas and national demands that deal with the new field reality of apartheid in all of Palestine, and just social programs that restore to people even a part of their deprived rights, and modern political representation through young professional leaders and faces who have been deprived of responsibilities in managing the affairs of the Palestinian people, not associated in the eyes of the general public with the tragedies of past years. Such a proposal is not revolutionary or rebellious, but rather a frank conclusion of the repercussions of the dilapidated state of Palestinian governance and the inevitability of getting rid of the legacy of both the non-liberationist Oslo and the non-national separatist projects. Therefore, the upcoming self-governance experience in the context of the Gaza administration committee and its absorption of cadres from both Hamas and the Authority governments, can be seized by Palestinians not only in defense of the larger project and its reconstitution process, but because it is the high price that must be paid to stop the Israeli genocidal advance in Gaza and deter it, and to provide the minimum necessities of life and hope for its people. It may seem today that the Palestinian political system is at a dead end, at least for two years, with no promised or binding horizon for liberation and self-determination. But what is not taken into account when looking at the fragmented Palestinian political scene is that the Gaza Committee derives functional legitimacy within the limits of its administrative, service, and security powers, and enjoys perhaps unprecedented Palestinian, Arab, and international consensus for a Palestinian political entity, and will be mandated and empowered to perform its humanitarian mission by the largest global power. Nevertheless, it may find its actual national legitimacy as it is not a "local committee" as some belittle it, not because it is affiliated with the organization or approved by Hamas, but because it is a national institution responsible to its people, meaning it is a transitional state institution, or the first administrative offspring of the future state of Palestine. Even if this administration is under American and international guardianship in Gaza, the organization launched months ago the process of transitioning from the entity of the National Authority to the entity of the State of Palestine through drafting a constitutional document and setting a program for holding elections for its institutions within a year. This is an ongoing process that seems irreversible regardless of the organization's leadership controlling its helm. This process, if allowed to continue, will bring the state of Palestinian governance, including its transitional self-governing institutions, to a declared or perhaps more fundamental unity, within the framework of a non-sovereign State of Palestine, representing an organizational and mobilization tool for all Palestinians wherever they are, in the face of the project to end their cause globally and their liberation project on the ground. There is no other way.