Israel's Recognition of Somaliland: Maritime Control and Reshaping Regional Influence

   The Somaliland region is distinguished by its highly sensitive geopolitical location on the coast of the Gulf of Aden, in the northern Horn of Africa, and on the southern shore of the Red Sea opposite Yemen,  bordered to the west by Djibouti, to the south by Ethiopia, and to the east by the Gulf of Aden, while it is legally considered part of Somalia under the existing international system.
Historically, the region was a British protectorate until 1960, before voluntarily uniting with Italian Somalia to declare the formation of the Somali Republic,  but this union soon revealed structural imbalances, manifested in the political and economic marginalization of the north, the absence of equal partnership in power, in addition to the bloody repression practiced by Siad Barre's regime, especially in the late 1980s. With the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, the northern elites and clans agreed to declare secession, based on the logic of "survival"  and building a stable entity in a turbulent regional environment.
In this context, "Israel" announced its recognition of the Somaliland region as an independent sovereign state, becoming the first and only country to take this step, and the recognition was met with international and regional reactions rejecting it, ranging from implicit affirmation of the principle of Somali territorial unity, as in the position of the United Nations, to explicit reaffirmation of this principle as done by the United States and the European Union, up to outright rejection and condemnation of the step as a threat to regional stability and a violation of Somalia's sovereignty, as issued by  the African Union and the Arab League, and central countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Qatar, and Turkey.
The Israeli recognition cannot be read in isolation from Somaliland's strategic geopolitical position, especially since it is located directly opposite the coasts under Houthi control on the Gulf of Aden. This location provides Israel, from a security–strategic perspective, a network of potential regional anchor points in a maritime environment that has become highly turbulent,  for Israel lacks real strategic depth on the Red Sea, with its direct presence limited to the port of Eilat, making any threat to navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb a matter that directly affects its national security.
From here, the recognition falls within the framework of what can be called "shadow war in the Red Sea",  for Israel sees in this step an opportunity to alleviate the pressure exerted by the Iranian–Houthi axis, encircle Houthi influence, neutralize the Bab el-Mandeb, and reduce Iran's ability to choke international navigation through this vital passage,  as the recognition also allows for indirect intelligence and security cooperation, without appearing as a direct occupying power, and without the need to establish declared military bases in Africa, in line with Israel's pattern of influence based on undeclared partnerships and low-profile presence.
In addition to the security dimension, Israel views Somaliland as a gateway to expanding its influence beyond the borders of the Middle East towards the African continent,  for the region constitutes a partner that desperately needs international recognition and external support, and at the same time is characterized by structural weakness that makes it more susceptible to unequal relationships. In this framework, Israel employs the discourse of "developmental cooperation" based on its expertise in agriculture, health, technology, and economy, which are sectors that Somaliland needs to enhance its resilience and gain international legitimacy.
One of the main points of "attraction"  for Somaliland lies, not for Israel alone but for a number of international actors, most notably the UAE,  Taiwan, and Ethiopia,  in being a relatively stable entity compared to its surroundings, governed by a government and institutions for more than three decades, despite the absence of international recognition. This practical stability, coupled with legal isolation, makes external recognition a valuable tool for breaking isolation, and turns legitimacy into a tradable political commodity.
Moreover, the step cannot be separated from the context of the "Abraham Accords",  but within new geographical boundaries that go beyond the Arab world,  for recognizing Somaliland presents Israel as a non-isolated regional power, capable of expanding its sphere of influence and building networks of relations in new geopolitical spaces. This creates regional leverage cards and a new negotiating reality, enhancing Israel's position in the region's balances, helping it break its international political isolation, and presenting itself as a diplomatic player capable of initiative rather than just reacting.
Finally, this recognition falls within a broader pattern in Israeli strategy based on “dividing the divided” and deepening divisions in the Arab world and the region, from Sudan, through Iraqi Kurdistan, the Druze areas in Syria, up to Somaliland. In this framework, the recognition is not understood as principled support for the right to self-determination, but rather as a selective political tool used to reshape the political geography in a way that serves Israeli power interests, even if the price is destabilizing regional stability and weakening the international legal system.