The sole purpose of this major escalation against civilians is certainly to reignite any area that Israelis believe has entered a phase of calm.

These steps come as part of the implementation of the second phase of the ceasefire agreement sponsored by President Trump's administration.

Gaza has paid a heavy price for what can be called “the sustainability of intelligence,” not because it possessed these technologies, but because it was one of the fields where they were tested and employed in their cruelest forms. Modern warfare is not only conducted with traditional weapons, but with artificial intelligence systems where data, algorithms, and automated decision-making intersect, redefining the meaning of control and dominance. In this context, Gaza was an intense space to experiment with how smart technology can be used against humans instead of for them.

Recent years have revealed that artificial intelligence is no longer confined to economics, medicine, or education, but has become a structural part of war and security systems. In Gaza, big data analysis techniques, pattern recognition, and predictive systems have been used in multiple areas: from continuous surveillance via drones, to communication analysis, to target classification systems that turn humans into “data points.” These technologies, globally marketed as tools of efficiency and accuracy, have in the Gazan reality transformed into tools for accelerating killing and reducing the distance between decision and destruction.

The price Gaza paid extended to civilian areas no less dangerous. Digital infrastructure was paralyzed, from communication networks to health and educational databases, leading to the loss or destruction of a massive amount of vital data. Hospitals were disrupted not only due to bombing, but due to the collapse of their supporting technical systems, from patient management systems to devices linked to medical records and therapeutic interventions. Education suffered when digital platforms were cut off, records were lost, and access to knowledge declined in a world that has come to rely on artificial intelligence as a primary medium for learning.

The price was not only material, but cognitive and ethical. What happened in Gaza contributed to the entrenchment of a dangerous model: a model that shows that artificial intelligence can operate with high efficiency in environments lacking any ethical balance or legal accountability. Thus, algorithms transformed into an invisible actor, unaccountable, yet leaving a profound impact on people's lives and future. This makes Gaza a stark example of the failure of the global discourse on “responsible artificial intelligence” when tested in a context of unequal power.

Despite this grim reality, the paradox is that artificial intelligence itself can be part of the path to recovery, reconstruction, and prosperity, not as a magical Aladdin's lamp, but as a tool that, if ethically and humanely reoriented, AI technologies can be used to accurately document damages initially, by analyzing satellite images to estimate urban and environmental losses, contributing to reconstruction planning on fair scientific bases. It can support the health sector through remote diagnostic models and smart systems for managing medical resources in an environment suffering from scarce capabilities.

Education, in turn, opens an important horizon for re-flourishing. AI educational tools provide flexible learning platforms, capable of overcoming spatial constraints and delivering customized content to students in exceptional circumstances. AI can play a role in preserving Gaza's collective memory, through archiving testimonies, analyzing narratives, and confronting deliberate digital misinformation.

This transformation requires a fundamental condition: shifting artificial intelligence from a position of control to a position of service, and from a logic of dominance to a logic of justice. It is impossible to talk about technological prosperity in Gaza without building digital sovereignty, data protection, rehabilitating basic infrastructure, and involving local competencies in designing solutions, not importing ready-made models detached from reality. Here, artificial intelligence becomes not just a technology, but a political and ethical choice.

Gaza's experience shows that the real question is no longer: What can artificial intelligence do? But rather: For whom does it work, and under what value system? Between destruction and reconstruction, artificial intelligence stands on the same edge as humanity. And the choice, in the end, is not merely technical, but eminently human.

American foreign policy under Donald Trump is no longer interpreted within the context of traditional alliances that formed the backbone of the international system since the end of World War II. Instead, it has become closer to a project of redefining the alliance itself.

Trump does not view partners as permanent strategic pillars, but rather as parties in a cost-benefit equation, which is reformulated whenever political and economic calculations change.

In his relationship with traditional allies, from Canada to Europe and Britain, Trump does not seek to dismantle alliances as much as he works to empty them of their value content and transform them into conditional relationships.

NATO is no longer, in his discourse, a collective security umbrella, but a financial bill that Europeans must pay.

 And the European Union is treated more as a commercial competitor than a political partner.

 Even Britain, which has long enjoyed the status of a “special ally,” has not escaped this logic, as privileges have become linked to economic and political compliance.

In this sense, the confrontation with allies is not a direct clash, but a gradual pressure process to reset their positions within narrow American priorities, based on the slogan “America First” in its most pragmatic and harsh form.

In contrast, China, in Trump's view, represents the real and structural adversary. The conflict with it goes beyond tariffs to the core of the global economic system: control over advanced technology, dominance over global supply chains, and leadership in the digital economy and artificial intelligence.

Here, Trumpism appears in its clearest form: no illusions of Chinese integration into the liberal system, no bets on changing behavior through trade, but a long-term struggle for influence and leadership.

However, the strategic paradox lies in the fact that pressure on Western allies weakens the front that is supposed to be united in confronting China. Weakening trust between the two sides of the Atlantic gives Beijing wider room for maneuver and confuses Western calculations instead of uniting them.

Here lies the central contradiction in Trump's policy: reducing international commitments on the one hand, and engaging in a wide-ranging global conflict on the other.

These transformations are not confined to the Western-Chinese sphere but extend their effects to developing countries, especially Arab countries. The transition of the international system from a “system of alliances” to a “system of deals” means a decline in the role of multilateral institutions, an escalation of protectionist tendencies, and a disruption of trade and investment rules.

Developing countries, which rely on the stability of global markets, the flow of investments, and open trade, find themselves in a more volatile and less predictable environment.

For Arab countries, the impact is evident at several levels.

 Firstly, rentier economies dependent on energy face dual risks: fluctuating global demand due to trade conflicts, and the accelerating global shift towards clean energy, in the absence of a stable international system to manage this transition in an organized manner.

 Secondly, non-oil Arab countries are affected by the disruption of global supply chains and the decline of foreign direct investment in an environment characterized by geopolitical uncertainty. Thirdly, the decline in American commitment to the multilateral international system opens the door for other powers to fill the vacuum, which forces Arab countries to strategically reposition themselves between Washington, Beijing, and Moscow, a repositioning fraught with risks if not managed wisely.

In conclusion, we are facing a world moving from a logic of rules to a logic of deals, and from relative stability to strategic fluidity.

 The limits of confrontation between Trump's America and its allies are not limits of war, but limits of trust that are gradually eroding.

 As for the confrontation with China, it is an open struggle over the shape of the international system in the twenty-first century. Between these two paths, developing countries find themselves in a gray area, where risks are increasing and margins for maneuver are shrinking.

It is a less certain, more pragmatic, and harsher world for countries that do not possess the tools of economic and political power.

In this context, Arab countries must not merely react, but develop strategies for economic diversification, multi-directional partnerships, and flexible foreign policies that protect their interests in a time of global turmoil.

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In contrast, China, in Trump's view, represents the real and structural adversary. The conflict with it goes beyond tariffs to the core of the global economic system: control over advanced technology, dominance over global supply chains, and leadership in the digital economy and artificial intelligence.

Gaza oscillates between projects to abduct and separate it from the West Bank, and attempts to remain part of the occupied territory. All eyes are on the administrative body formed to follow the peace council headed by Trump, and it is no longer a secret that Trump and Netanyahu are working to neutralize the role of the Palestinian Authority, and that they have decided to separate the Strip from the West Bank, and that Palestinian representation should be minimal, fragmented and faint, under the orders and instructions of what has become known as the Peace Council, and that this new body should not follow the institutions of the PLO or the Palestinian Authority, which are internationally recognized as representatives of the Palestinian people. This is not a recent paradox; rather, the constant endeavors of the occupation have been and still are to eliminate the unified representation of the Palestinian people, and throughout all decades, it has pushed for division at times, and for the formation of bodies, committees, and village leagues to serve as alternatives. Throughout those decades, the occupation continued to fail, and the PLO remained the representative of all Palestinians, both inside and outside, enjoying popular support and international recognition. For Palestinians, it is the spiritual home of all Palestinians, for which there is no alternative.

It is true that the enormous scale of destruction left by the war of extermination requires significant international intervention to rebuild the Strip, as the horrors of the war of extermination are terrible and the devastation it caused is immense, necessitating effective international intervention, but not in Trump's way, who seeks to possess Gaza and turn it into a treasury of his companies' assets and properties as one of his countless real estate holdings, and the ridiculous promotion we saw at the Davos conference of scenarios prepared for construction and investment operations with giant skyscrapers, resorts, and so on.

Gaza is not for sale and will not accept anyone owning it, so say the numbers registered at the Rafah crossing for return immediately upon its opening, a return that is not symbolic at all, but actual and practical, as large numbers of people wish to return to Gaza despite all the destruction and ruin, and a large part of them know that they are returning to no standing home, but rather the remnants of their home that was destroyed by bombing.

Trump's plans and projects to seize Gaza will fail due to the presence of Gazans connected to their land, just as they will reject all projects of dependency and mandate, for the right of Palestinians to live in freedom and independence is a sacred right that no one will relinquish.

This does not mean rejecting the administrative committee in what it represents, as it includes influential and national figures and highly competent Palestinian experts, but it means paying attention to its role if it is linked to a political role far from the Palestinian Liberation Organization, in addition to the role assigned to it in terms of the reconstruction process after the war of extermination.

The enemy seeks to turn protests into civil war.

These raids, which targeted the residential depth of Gaza City, reinforce fears of a return to targeting civilian apartments away from direct engagement axes.

A war that revealed the true face of Western civilization, and how it blatantly sided with a criminal Zionist entity.

Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad: What is being put forward is not an electoral context, and at its core, it reflects a deeply rooted Israeli conviction to reject a Palestinian state and translate that practically.

Khalil Shaheen: The strategic convergence between Netanyahu and Trump is to block the empowerment of Palestinians to self-determination and establish their independent state.

Dr. Walaa Qudaimat: Netanyahu is politically committed to obstructing the establishment of a Palestinian state as part of a consistent strategy that views its establishment as a direct threat to the Israeli project.

Mohammed Al-Rajoub: Netanyahu's 'no's' constitute a tool to disrupt "political time," allowing Israel to impose facts on the ground and keep the international community preoccupied with crisis management.

Dr. Amjad Bashkar: Netanyahu's statements cannot be read as an inevitable roadmap, but rather as a pressure card and a deterrent message primarily directed at Palestinians.

Suleiman Basharat: Netanyahu seeks to present himself as the leader most committed to what is called "the Jewishness of the state" and rejecting any political concession to the Palestinians.

Ramallah - Exclusive to "Al-Quds" - The "no's" of the occupation government's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, are once again at the forefront, serving as an intense expression of a deeply rooted Israeli stance that categorically rejects the establishment of a Palestinian state, whether in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, coinciding with his raising the slogan "Israel from the River to the Sea."

Writers, political analysts, specialists, and university professors, in separate interviews with "Al-Quds," believe that Netanyahu's recent statements regarding the rejection of a Palestinian state and the affirmation of the occupation of all Palestinian territories do not appear to be mere fleeting political rhetoric, but rather reflect a deeply entrenched strategic direction that has become one of the pillars of Israeli consensus, extending beyond electoral squabbles to systematic policies translated on the ground.

A careful reading of these statements reveals that Netanyahu's "no's" are no longer limited to a specific Israeli current, but have transformed into a comprehensive conviction within the Israeli political establishment, strengthened in recent years, especially after October 7, 2023.

This shift, according to writers, analysts, specialists, and university professors, has been accompanied by a de facto erosion of the two-state solution path, in light of rapid settlement expansion in the West Bank, and imposed arrangements in the Gaza Strip aimed at managing the population without granting them any sovereign or political horizon, thereby emptying the idea of a Palestinian state of its content.

They believe that Netanyahu's "no's" serve multiple functions; they are a tool to unite the Israeli interior and ensure the cohesion of the right-wing coalition, a pressure and deterrent message directed at Palestinians, as well as a bargaining chip used externally depending on the balance of power, especially in relations with the United States, although these "no's" remain subject to erosion whenever a high political or international cost is imposed.

Strategy of "Israeli National Consensus"

Political writer and analyst Dr. Ahmed Rafiq Awad believes that the statements of the occupation government's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, in which he stressed the non-establishment of a Palestinian state and that "Israel is from the River to the Sea," cannot be read as fleeting electoral positions, but rather represent a fundamental strategic vision that forms the core of what is known as "Israeli national consensus" that crystallized around 2004 with the end of Ariel Sharon's era.

Awad clarifies that the rejection of a Palestinian state is no longer a position exclusive to the Israeli right, but has become a broad consensus among various Israeli parties, including the left, and this consensus has been further strengthened after October 7, 2023.

Awad points out that Netanyahu has continuously expressed these positions since the 1990s, both in his writings and in his political stances, especially his explicit opposition to the Oslo Accords, and his practical behavior during his terms as prime minister until today.

A Conviction Translated on the Ground

Awad explains that what is being put forward today in political statements is happening in an electoral context, but at its core, it reflects a deeply rooted Israeli conviction to reject a Palestinian state, a conviction that is translated on the ground through the complete dismantling of the idea of establishing a state, through the extensive annexation of the West Bank, and the imposition of arrangements in the Gaza Strip that resemble international guardianship or disguised occupation, in addition to marginalizing the role of the Palestinian Authority and weakening it politically and economically.

Awad indicates that Israel has begun to propose new alternatives for managing Palestinian affairs, such as self-rule, tribal rule, or administrative rule, considering that the most dangerous aspect of this is the shift in the American position, as American administrations, including the current one, are no longer committed to the two-state solution as the only option.

American and European Abandonment of the Two-State Solution

Awad points out that the Trump administration explicitly stated that it does not see the two-state solution as the only scenario, which was reflected in its non-negotiation with the Palestinian Authority, its non-recognition of it, and the retention of the American embassy's relocation to Jerusalem after its annexation, in a step that reinforces the Israeli vision.

Awad indicates that this retreat is not limited to the United States, but extends to the European Union, which no longer sees the two-state solution as the optimal form of solution, and has begun to impose impossible conditions on the Palestinian Authority under the title of reform, and has also supported international resolutions that do not explicitly mention the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Awad believes that the two-state solution was practically abandoned after three decades of procrastination and delay since 1994, stressing that no one seriously worked to achieve it, whether internationally, Arab, or Islamic, which necessitated searching for other political options and solutions in light of the complete collapse of this path.

Deeply Rooted Ideological Convictions

Political writer and analyst Khalil Shaheen confirms that the statements of the occupation government's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state do not represent a new position, but rather a re-affirmation of a historical position he has expressed repeatedly, and even previously boasted that he was instrumental in preventing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Shaheen explains that this rejection is not only linked to immediate electoral calculations, despite their presence, but is primarily based on deeply rooted ideological convictions adopted by Netanyahu since his opposition to the Oslo Accords and the plan for withdrawal and redeployment from the Gaza Strip.

Shaheen explains that Netanyahu relies on a broad Israeli base for this position, which has been particularly strengthened after October 7, 2023, noting that this trend has been practically translated into official decisions, most notably the Knesset's decision in July 2024, which was voted on by 68 members, and considered the establishment of a Palestinian state an "existential threat" to Israel, and rejected any political negotiation path related to the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Shaheen points out that this decision came during the Biden administration and before the return of US President Donald Trump to the White House, which reflects an Israeli consensus across the coalition and opposition.

Shaheen indicates that the danger of this decision lies not only in its content, but in the extent of support it received, as it was not limited to coalition parties, but was also supported by opposition forces, led by Gantz's party, while other parties such as "Yesh Atid" and "Labor" withdrew from the session, and most of them abstained from voting against the decision, while only nine Knesset members opposed it, which confirms the existence of a near-Israeli consensus on rejecting a Palestinian state.

Shaheen stresses that focusing solely on Netanyahu's statements overlooks the essence of the ongoing policies on the ground, which aim to undermine any opportunity for the establishment of a Palestinian state, and even work to weaken the Palestinian Authority and gradually transform it into something resembling a "union of municipalities" in the West Bank, at a time when Israel rejects the return of the Authority to the Gaza Strip in any form.

Fragmentation of the Palestinian Political Entity

Shaheen believes that the Israeli plan, which in some aspects aligns with American proposals, aims to fragment the Palestinian political entity, either by deepening the division between the West Bank and Gaza, or by dismantling the central authority in the West Bank itself.

Shaheen explains that Netanyahu has adopted a strategy for years based on strengthening the separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and he is continuing to deepen this separation, while seeking to weaken the Authority in the West Bank, and perhaps drawing inspiration from alternative governance models, such as technocratic committees or local administrations based on tribes and families, within the framework of projects that have been circulated in Israel, including what is known as the "Seven Emirates" plan in the West Bank.

Regarding the Gaza Strip, Shaheen believes that what is known as Trump's "Twenty-Point Plan" largely intersects with Netanyahu's vision, as it does not offer a clear commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state, but rather treats it as a deferred possibility linked to long negotiations, after the completion of Gaza's reconstruction according to an economic investment model. Shaheen points out that this plan, like the economic plans discussed by American economists, ignores the right to self-determination, and seeks to transform Gaza into a long-term investment area, while obscuring the political and national dimension of the Palestinian issue.

Shaheen confirms that these proposals are based on the expropriation of private property, and opening the way for investments with long-term contracts that may extend for decades, with the displacement of large numbers of the Strip's residents, which some of the authors of these plans themselves described as having a colonial character.

Shaheen points out that these models were also proposed as applicable in the West Bank, through economic approaches that separate Palestinians from their national project.

Shaheen stresses that the strategic convergence between the Netanyahu government and the Trump administration is to block the empowerment of Palestinians to exercise their right to self-determination and establish their independent state, including East Jerusalem, even if there are tactical differences regarding the speed and pace of implementation, especially in the Gaza Strip.

Facts that Eliminate the Palestinian State Project

Shaheen explains that Netanyahu also uses this intransigence in the context of the Israeli electoral bazaar, seeking to maintain the cohesion of his coalition in light of internal crises related to the budget and the conscription law, and to avoid increasing pressure to form an investigation committee into the events of October 7, 2023.

Shaheen stresses that what is happening on the ground in terms of settlement expansion, demolition, settler attacks, and continuous security escalation, reflects a systematic policy that goes beyond rhetoric, and aims to impose final facts that practically eliminate the Palestinian state project.

Undermining the Possibility of a Palestinian State

Writer and political researcher Dr. Walaa Qudaimat stresses that the Palestinian state represents a political and historical entitlement for the Palestinian people and is not a grant from any party, considering that the recent statements of the occupation government's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, come in the context of a practical translation of the policies pursued by successive Israeli governments aimed at undermining the possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state.

Qudaimat explains that Netanyahu is politically and clearly committed to obstructing the establishment of a Palestinian state, and that his position is not temporary or linked to a specific stage, but rather falls within a consistent Israeli strategy that views the establishment of a Palestinian state as a direct threat to the Israeli project in the region, according to the ideological vision of his political current.

Qudaimat points out that this commitment is evident in various Israeli policies that work to weaken the foundations of the Palestinian state at the geographical, political, and economic levels.

Pushing Towards Normalization Without Political Costs

Qudaimat explains that Netanyahu employs all current developments on the regional and international arenas to push towards unconditional normalization, especially bypassing the condition of establishing a Palestinian state in exchange for normalization, noting that his continuous attempts to invest in regional changes reflect an Israeli endeavor to impose new political realities that ignore Palestinian national rights.

Creating Conditions for the Impossibility of a Palestinian State

Qudaimat explains that the Palestinian project is read within Israel as a direct undermining of the Zionist project, which drives Israeli governments to dedicate their efforts to creating conditions that make the establishment of a Palestinian state impossible, whether through the fragmentation of Palestinian geography or the weakening of the Palestinian political and institutional structure.

Qudaimat confirms that Israel also seeks to establish a Palestinian reality incapable of achieving the state project at the Palestinian, regional, and international levels, thereby preventing the attainment of full recognition and sovereignty.

The State and the Fruit of Long Struggle

Qudaimat stresses that Palestinians must realize that the Palestinian state is the fruit of a long struggle and immense sacrifices, and not a grant given in the context of political settlements.

Qudaimat emphasizes the need for the Palestinian leadership to be aware of the dangers threatening the state project, warning that any talk of establishing a state in the Gaza Strip separate from the rest of the Palestinian territories would constitute a serious undermining of the Palestinian people's entitlements and national unity.

Electoral Propaganda and Calculated Strategy

Academic and researcher in public administration and political science Mohammed Al-Rajoub explains that the repeated statements of the occupation government's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, regarding the rejection of a Palestinian state, and his raising of the slogan "Israel from the River to the Sea," cannot be understood in a single framework, but rather combine electoral propaganda directed at the Israeli interior, and a calculated political strategy aimed at managing the conflict with Palestinians rather than resolving it.

Al-Rajoub explains that Netanyahu's discourse, which is based on repeating "no's" such as no Palestinian state and no withdrawal, outwardly appears as a definitive statement of position, but a reading of Netanyahu's political experience and the context of his statements reveals that it is not about a rigid doctrine as much as it is a functional political language used flexibly according to the balance of power, especially in relations with the United States.

Al-Rajoub points out that these statements cannot be separated from the Israeli internal environment, where Netanyahu leads a fragile coalition based on an alliance of the national and religious right and the most extremist currents.

Israeli Mobilization Discourse

Al-Rajoub points out that this political base does not demand political solutions as much as it demands continuous ideological reassurance, which Netanyahu is keen to provide through a mobilizing discourse that affirms the constants of the Zionist project and reproduces a sense of Israeli superiority and dominance.

Al-Rajoub explains that the slogan "Israel from the River to the Sea" is not put forward as a legal project or a constitutional vision for a single state, but rather as a mobilizing slogan aimed at charging the collective consciousness of the right, and closing the door to any theoretical discussion about the Palestinian state, even before delving into the details of political solutions.

Al-Rajoub confirms that the real danger in this discourse lies in the fact that it reflects a strategy of conflict management, not resolution, as Netanyahu, despite his long years in power, has not presented a comprehensive vision for a settlement, nor has he gone for full annexation, but has maintained a gray area that keeps Palestinians in a state of "no state and no sovereign rights," with security and economic management that prevents explosion without opening a political horizon.

A Tool to Disrupt "Political Time"

Al-Rajoub believes that Netanyahu's 'no's' constitute a tool to disrupt "political time," allowing Israel to expand settlements and impose new facts on the ground, geographically and demographically, while the international community remains preoccupied with managing the crisis instead of resolving it.

Al-Rajoub points to a fundamental contradiction in Netanyahu's behavior, represented by rhetorical rigidity versus practical flexibility when real American pressure is available, citing previous understandings of calm and security arrangements.

Al-Rajoub considers that this contradiction is not a weakness, but a style of governance that relies on publicly announcing rejection, and passing retreats in security or temporary forms.

Al-Rajoub confirms that Netanyahu's statements do not represent final positions as much as they are a moving negotiating ceiling, which turns into a de facto policy in the absence of American will, and is recycled as a tool for internal propaganda and a deeper strategy to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, despite its susceptibility to collapse whenever the balance of power changes.

Higher Political Load

Political science professor Dr. Amjad Bashkar believes that the statements of the occupation government's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state, and his raising of the slogan "Israel from the River to the Sea," are not new in their content, but they carry a higher political load in the current circumstances, and can be understood within three main levels: internal, external, and ideological.

Bashkar explains that the first level is the Israeli internal level, where these statements fall within the framework of clear electoral propaganda, even if wrapped in ideological discourse.

Bashkar explains that through his statements, Netanyahu addresses his solid base of the Israeli right and settlers, in addition to his allies from extremist right-wing parties, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.

Bashkar believes that the slogan "Israel from the River to the Sea" does not constitute an executive plan as much as it is an affirmation of Netanyahu's political identity and a message in which he presents himself as "the true guarantor of the complete Zionist project."

Bashkar confirms that Netanyahu has accustomed, in times of political or judicial crises or during wars and protests, to resorting to intensifying ideological discourse in order to unite his base and prevent its erosion.

A Tool for Negotiation and Pressure

On the external level, Bashkar indicates that these statements represent a tool for negotiation and pressure, and not a final political declaration.

Bashkar points out that Netanyahu historically raises the ceiling of his ideological discourse and then begins a gradual retreat when a stronger balance of power is imposed on him, whether due to international or American pressure.

Based on this, Bashkar believes that Netanyahu's statements cannot be read as an inevitable roadmap, but rather as a pressure card and a deterrent message primarily directed at Palestinians.

As for the ideological level, Bashkar confirms that Netanyahu's recognition of a Palestinian state would practically mean the end of his political project, not only for him personally, but also for his allies within the Israeli right.

Bashkar stresses that Netanyahu, even if he accepts certain compromises on the ground, cannot explicitly announce them, because that would lead to the loss of his political alliances.

The Fall of the 'No's' Before American Will

Bashkar believes that the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state in the current stage is unrealistic, in light of the large settlement expansion since 2017, which has swallowed vast areas of West Bank lands, in addition to the escalating geographical division in the Gaza Strip.

Bashkar explains that Netanyahu's "no's" fall only when there is a clear American will or when the cost of continued rejection becomes high for Israel.

Bashkar confirms that Netanyahu always seeks a political way out that "saves face," noting that several sensitive issues, such as settlements, calm, security coordination, and taxes, have seen actual retreats despite the hardline rhetoric.

Bashkar points out that Netanyahu raises the ceiling of his rejectionist discourse when he feels that the balance of power temporarily favors him, but these "no's" quickly remain only in the media, and are emptied of their content on the ground if the American position changes.

Burying the Future Establishment of a Palestinian State

Political writer and analyst Suleiman Basharat explains that the recent statements of the occupation government's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, especially those related to rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state whether in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, clearly express the essence of the strategic goal of Israeli behavior towards Palestinians, and reveal a deeply rooted mentality that works to bury any future possibility of establishing a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders.

Basharat points out that when Netanyahu said: "The establishment of a Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip has not happened and will not happen," he was not expressing a temporary or tactical position, but rather a comprehensive strategic vision based on solidifying an Israeli conviction that it is impossible to establish a Palestinian state in any part of the Palestinian land, whether in the West Bank or Gaza.

Basharat confirms that Israeli behavior on the ground and politically is consistent with this vision, through policies of encroachment, settlement, blockade, and the excessive use of force.

The Leader Most Committed to the "Jewishness of the State"

Basharat explains that Netanyahu invests this discourse in two main dimensions, the first being the Israeli internal dimension, where he seeks to present himself as the leader most committed to what is called "the Jewishness of the state" and rejecting any political concession to the Palestinians, in an attempt to win over the Israeli public and the extremist right-wing current, and to prepare the ground for his re-election in the event of early elections, likely in October.

Regional and International Messages

The second dimension, according to Basharat, relates to regional and international messages, as Netanyahu confirms through them that Israel is not prepared to trade the future of the Palestinian state for any other issues, including the normalization process and the "Abraham Accords."

Basharat believes that Netanyahu's talk about the possibility of new countries joining these agreements, specifically under the conditions put forward by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, aims to bypass the Palestinian issue, and establish a new regional phase in which Palestinian rights are marginalized.

American-Israeli Consensus on the Conflict

Regarding the American position, Basharat believes that there is an Israeli-American consensus on the essence and strategy of the conflict, where the United States provides political cover and military support for Israeli behavior, but differs with Tel Aviv on the nature of the tools.

Basharat points out that Washington prefers to use the political path and indirect pressures to push Palestinians to accept the existing reality, while Israel tends towards the option of decisive force and the excessive use of military power.

Basharat believes that this discrepancy is evident in issues such as Gaza's reconstruction, resistance weapons, and withdrawal from the Strip, where the American administration seeks to link political incentives and reconstruction with disarmament, while Israel believes that direct force is the most effective way to achieve its goals.

Basharat emphasizes the danger of American adoption of the Israeli vision, warning that the failure of the political path may push Washington to grant Israel broader authorization to use force, in light of strong Israeli influence within American decision-making circles, which means the continuation of the Israeli colonial project that began in 1948 and continues to this day.

News Analysis

The pressure exerted by President Donald Trump's administration this week on Saudi Arabia to support military action against Iran demonstrates a renewed American insistence on a regional approach that has repeatedly proven to be a failure: transforming military superiority into a tool for re-engineering political balances. Instead of reading the profound shifts in the calculations of its Gulf allies, Washington treats the region as if it were still a malleable arena that can be managed by coercive deterrence and limited strikes.

The American approach stems from the assumption that Iran is experiencing a moment of structural weakness after the strikes it targeted in 2025, and that this moment represents a "strategic window" that should be exploited before Tehran rebuilds its capabilities. However, this thinking reflects a deficiency in understanding the nature of contemporary conflicts in the Middle East, where confrontations are not decided merely by destroying military targets, but by the ability of parties to absorb the shock and reproduce deterrence tools through less costly and more flexible means.

In this context, the visit of Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman to Washington seemed more like an explicit test of the limits of American influence over its allies. The offers made by the Trump administration, represented by long-term "security guarantees," clashed with an American record burdened by unfulfilled promises. The experience of the Aramco attack in 2019 is still strongly present in Saudi consciousness, not only as a security failure, but as a pivotal point that revealed the limits of American response when strategic priorities conflict with the cost of direct confrontation.

What Washington ignores, or deliberately overlooks, is that the Gulf states no longer view Iran from a zero-sum conflict perspective. After years of attrition, these states have reached a practical balance equation that allows for managing the disagreement with Tehran without sliding into an open confrontation. This balance, despite its fragility, has enabled Gulf capitals to reduce risks to energy security and control indirect engagement arenas, especially in Yemen and maritime passages.

In contrast, the United States continues to invest in the logic of military force as an alternative to political strategy. Military buildups, from aircraft carriers to air defense systems and air deployments in Jordan, may give Washington high operational capability, but they do not provide an answer to the question of what comes after the strike. Rather, this buildup deepens Gulf fears that they will find themselves at the heart of a conflict in whose decision they were not a partner, but they will be the first to pay its price.

Iran, for its part, is adept at exploiting this contradiction. Announcements of military maneuvers in the Strait of Hormuz, and the brandishing of the proxy card in the Red Sea, are nothing but psychological and political deterrence tools targeting allies before adversaries. The Iranian message is clear: any American strike will translate into long-term instability, not a "clean end" as American rhetoric suggests.

The most dangerous aspect of the current American approach is that it assumes the controllability of escalation, as if the region has not previously experienced the logic of "unintended slide." Recent history, from Iraq to Afghanistan, provides striking examples of how "limited" operations turned into strategic quagmires. Nevertheless, Washington continues to deal with the Gulf as a margin whose stability can be sacrificed for short-term deterrent gains.

Ultimately, the disagreement between Washington and Riyadh does not lie in the degree of hostility towards Iran, but in the definition of security itself. While American policy reduces security to militarily weakening the adversary, the Gulf states link it to economic and social stability and state sustainability. This contradiction makes American pressure not only unrealistic, but fraught with the danger of reproducing the crises it claims to seek to resolve.

American policy towards Iran reflects a chronic tendency to prefer military tools over political solutions, even when facts demonstrate the limitations of this option. The insistence on testing strength, instead of investing in managing balances, reveals a short-sighted strategic mentality that ignores the cost of regional repercussions. In this context, the Gulf rejection of war does not appear to be a defensive stance, but a more realistic reading of the complexities of the conflict.

The danger of the American approach lies in the assumption that allies will automatically align behind military decisions. However, the Gulf states have become more independent in their calculations, and less willing to bear the cost of choices they were not partners in formulating. This shift places Washington in a strategic dilemma: either review its policy, or risk the erosion of its influence in the world's most sensitive regions.

News Analysis

The Israeli occupation authorities, through the Coordinator of Government Activities, announced an agreement to reopen the Rafah border crossing starting Monday morning. This move initially appeared to be a response to accumulated humanitarian pressures, but upon closer inspection, it quickly revealed a familiar Israeli pattern of granting facilities with one hand and withdrawing their essence with the other. The announced reopening is nothing more than a partial and restricted opening, limited to the movement of people only, and subject to direct Israeli security oversight, which empties the measure of its sovereign and humanitarian content.

According to the announcement, entry and exit operations will be carried out according to a precise coordination mechanism with the Egyptian side, with the tasks of field supervision assigned to a European party. However, this "international" cover does not change the fact that the final decision remains in the hands of the occupation, which stipulated prior security approval for each crossing. Thus, the crossing transforms from a sovereign Palestinian-Egyptian gateway into an advanced security checkpoint subject to Israeli military will, even if mediated by third parties.

While the arrangements allow Palestinians to return from Egypt to the Gaza Strip, especially those who left during the war, this return is conditional on a series of strict "Israeli scrutiny" procedures. These procedures are presented, as usual, under the pretext of "preventing security threats," a vague pretext historically used by the occupation to perpetuate the policy of collective punishment, maintain control over the movement of residents, and transform the natural right to movement into a security privilege that can be granted or denied.

This step comes in the context of diplomatic pressures led by the US administration, where President Donald Trump's administration seeks to market what it calls "logistical solutions" to alleviate the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, without addressing the roots of the crisis or compromising the occupation's security superiority. What is required by the US is not an end to the siege, but its reorganization in a less blatant and more politically and media-marketable way.

Trump believes that subjecting Gaza's crossings to international, especially European, supervision is part of a broader deal aimed at reducing the influence of Palestinian factions and strengthening the monitoring system for the movement of individuals, thereby transforming the crossings into tools of security control rather than lifelines. In this context, Egyptian-American coordination is presented as a crucial factor in "extracting" the decision, but in essence, it reflects complex pressures exerted on Cairo to manage the file in a way that prioritizes Washington's and Tel Aviv's interests more than it responds to Palestinian rights.

In this context, the following five points must be highlighted:

1. Israeli Evasion in a Humanitarian Guise: The limited reopening of the Rafah crossing reflects a recurring Israeli pattern of circumventing international pressure through superficial steps. The occupation does not openly reject facilities, but redefines them in a way that keeps control in its hands. The use of humanitarian titles to conceal a security-military essence is part of this evasion, where the measure is marketed as a breakthrough, while practically it is established as a new tool for controlling the population and their movement.

2. Is European Supervision a Cover or a Partnership?: The involvement of a European party in field supervision does not mean a real internationalization of the crossing, as much as it provides political and moral cover for Israeli arrangements. Past experiences indicate that this role is often technical and supervisory, without the ability to challenge Israeli decisions. Instead of European supervision serving as a guarantee for Palestinians, it may turn into a silent partner in managing the siege in a "soft" manner.

3. Security Scrutiny as a Political Weapon: What is called "Israeli scrutiny" is not a neutral security measure, but a political tool par excellence. Through it, the occupation retains the right of veto over the return of individuals, and reclassifies Palestinians according to vague security criteria. This approach does not aim at security as much as it aims to re-engineer Palestinian society, control its demographic composition, and collectively punish Gaza under the banner of prevention.

4. The American Role: Crisis Management, Not Resolution: The American approach, as reflected in the pressures of the Trump administration, stems from the principle of managing the crisis instead of resolving it. What is required is to mitigate the humanitarian explosion to prevent political embarrassment, not to end the siege or address its structural causes. Thus, "logistical solutions" become temporary painkillers, keeping the essence of Israeli control intact, and postponing the explosion instead of addressing it.

5. Rafah Crossing Between Sovereignty and Security Function: The core issue is not opening or closing the crossing, but the question: who owns sovereignty over it? The proposed formula empties the Rafah crossing of its meaning as a sovereign outlet, and transforms it into a security function within a regional-international system for managing Gaza. Unless this link is broken, every opening will remain temporary, every breakthrough conditional, and every hope susceptible to setback.

The reopening of the Rafah crossing, in its current form, is not a breaking of the siege as much as it is a reorganization of it. Between American pressures, Israeli evasion, and limited international supervision, the Palestinian remains the weakest link, granted his natural right conditionally, and asked to be grateful for what is supposed to be a right, not a favor.

In a visit that raised deep political and ethical questions, former CIA Director General David Petraeus appeared at the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC), run by the US Army in southern Israel, tasked with overseeing what is described as "ceasefire" arrangements in the Gaza Strip. The visit, revealed by diplomatic sources to "Drop Site," was not merely protocol but carried implications beyond security to the political, economic, and social re-engineering of Gaza.

Petraeus, one of the most prominent architects of the American "counter-insurgency" doctrine, praised in his speech the Israeli army's shift towards the "clear, hold, and build" model, the same model he applied in Iraq and Afghanistan, which involved dividing cities into "gated communities" subject to security surveillance and biometric identification systems. This praise came after his previous criticisms of Israel for not learning the lessons of the American occupation of Iraq.

Days before Petraeus's visit, the US Army had presented to the CMCC a vision for what was called the "first planned community for Gaza" in Rafah, a closed residential complex accommodating about 25,000 Palestinians, under full Israeli military control, and subject to a biometric entry system, "rehabilitation" programs, and strict control over aid and housing. According to informed sources, the project is seen as an experimental model for "New Gaza," funded by the UAE.

Petraeus's visit coincided with US President Donald Trump's announcement at the Davos Forum of a "Peace Council," where he presented Gaza not as a political or humanitarian issue, but as a "real estate" investment opportunity on the sea. His son-in-law Jared Kushner followed by announcing an economic development plan for Gaza, emphasizing "aligning security and governance frameworks" to attract investors, in a speech that clearly reveals the priority of capital over rights.

This scene recalls Petraeus's own history; the man led the "military surge" in Iraq in 2007, contributed to the militarization of society by arming militias, expanded secret night operations, and was a central player in America's hidden wars in the region. Today, the same logic returns, but with a facade of "reconstruction" and "governance."

Petraeus's interest in Gaza is inseparable from his current position as a partner and chairman of the Middle East Institute at "Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. KKR," one of the largest American investment firms, with extensive investments in cybersecurity, digital identity, and defense, with direct ties to Israel. Here, security doctrine intersects with capital interests, and population control becomes a profit opportunity.

In his speech, Petraeus praised the CMCC's efforts in delivering aid, even though Israel still prevents essential materials and bans the work of dozens of organizations, which led European countries to withdraw their staff from the center. This contradiction reveals the center's function: managing the crisis, not solving it, and organizing the siege, not lifting it.

In the background, the Gaza gas file emerges as a potential financial lever for reconstruction, within a network of interests linking Israel, the UAE, and Western investment companies, within the broader framework of the Abraham Accords. Thus, Palestinian resources become a guarantee for projects over which Palestinians have no say.

Amjad Al-Shawa, head of the Palestinian NGO Network, criticized these proposals in a statement to "Drop Site," considering them a "beautiful image designed by artificial intelligence," which does not reflect reality and does not consult Palestinians, asking: Who will own the rebuilt Gaza? And who will serve whom?

Petraeus's visit – the general who quelled the resistance in Iraq – in this context, is not a fleeting event, but an indicator of the intersection of security and investment, where Gaza is redefined as a space for population control, an emerging market, and a laboratory for "soft war" doctrines, while Palestinians are reduced to a labor force or permanent residents in "gated communities."

According to many experts, what is proposed for Gaza is not reconstruction, but a forced reshaping of society under a single security-economic umbrella. The "gated communities" model does not address the roots of the conflict but transfers a failed experience from Iraq to a more fragile context. It is a project of mass control, managed by data and biometric cards, aiming to separate the population from politics, and transform rights into privileges conditioned by obedience.

Moreover, the discourse of US President Trump, his son-in-law, and Kushner reveals the new colonial mentality: land as an investment site, and population as a security variable. Political language is absent in favor of market language, and the national question is erased in favor of "governance" and "investment attractiveness." In this framework, Gaza becomes an experimental project for security capitalism, where profits take precedence over sovereignty, and forced stability over justice.

Human rights experts warn that the deeper danger in this approach lies in dressing up a prison as reconstruction. As Ghassan Abu-Sittah points out, Gaza is being transformed from an open-air prison into a high-tech closed prison, where the goal is not to liberate daily life but to manage and control it. It is an engineering of a future without a political horizon, where the body is managed instead of aspirations being protected, and suffering is transformed from a human wound into a resource for investment and control.

Documented cases of bodies returned to their families after long periods of detention that were "missing organs."

Attacks by Israeli occupation forces continue in the West Bank and occupied Jerusalem, including raiding homes and villages and firing sound bombs.

What is being proposed today is not a peace project, but an attempt to achieve political gains that the occupation failed to impose militarily.

Disclosing staff data under the current circumstances could expose their lives to direct danger.

Tel Aviv will retain 'remote' monitoring through security operations rooms equipped with facial recognition technologies.

The departure of senior US leaders from the Gaza mission raises ambiguity about the future of 'Trump's plan' for post-war.

Entry and exit operations through the crossing will take place within a precise coordination mechanism with the Egyptian side, but they will remain subject to direct security approval from the occupation authorities.

With the war of extermination in Gaza moving into a new phase, less intense in bombing and more focused on siege, delegitimizing the resistance, and pushing Palestinian society towards internal conflict, the Israeli occupation has returned to dedicate itself more broadly to the open decisive front in Jerusalem, and alongside it, the annexation and displacement front in the West Bank. These two fronts will lead the occupation's strategy in the coming period, even if interrupted by a temporary escalation on the Lebanese, Syrian, or even Iranian fronts.

One of the most prominent goals of this path is to reach “final borders” for Jerusalem, by annexing the largest possible number of settlements and settlers, and swallowing the widest possible geographical area, in exchange for excluding the largest number of Jerusalemites from the city's demographic and political equation.

Within this context, the occupation launched a series of operations it called “Shield of Jerusalem.” Its first episodes began on December 23, 2025, targeting Kafr Aqab and Qalandia refugee camp, which were separated from Jerusalem by the wall. This was followed by a second episode on January 12, 2026, against Shuafat refugee camp, which lasted several days, and came as a prelude to the demolition of the UNRWA headquarters in Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood on January 20 of the same year.

On January 26, 2026, the occupation launched the third episode of these campaigns, directing its operations to the Qalandia Airport neighborhood inside the wall, and to the towns of Kafr Aqab and Hizma outside it. In just two days, more than forty properties were demolished in the vicinity of Qalandia Airport, and more than seventy properties in the three areas combined, according to the Jerusalem Governorate. This number is equivalent to approximately 28% of the total demolition operations witnessed in Jerusalem throughout 2025, which was already the most destructive year since the occupation of the city in 1967.

In short, we are facing a return of the center of the decisive battle to Jerusalem, at an unprecedented pace, which necessitates restoring the will to defend it in all possible forms, foremost among them restoring popular action in the post-extermination phase. Otherwise, the result will be more Zionist encroachment heading towards final liquidation.

As for the ongoing aggression in northern Jerusalem, it can be read as follows:

First, it constitutes a prelude to building a large settlement on the ruins of the Jerusalem International Airport in Qalandia, which was opened during the Jordanian era, and its lands, amounting to about 1200 dunams, are still registered in the name of the Jordanian State Treasury. Despite the Wadi Araba agreement, the occupation treats this land as its heir and plans to establish about 9400 settlement units, integrated with the “Atarot” industrial zone to the south, and with the Qalandia checkpoint to the north, thereby consecrating the separation of Kafr Aqab and Qalandia camp from Jerusalem not only by the wall, but by overlapping residential, industrial, and security layers.

Second, for years, the occupation deliberately left Kafr Aqab as the sole outlet for Jerusalemite construction, overlooking urban chaos, with the aim of turning it into a population magnet before its final separation from Jerusalem, thereby excluding the largest possible number of Jerusalemites. Thus, the town became a severely overcrowded area, with weak infrastructure, immersed in daily friction, to the extent that the people of Jerusalem began to call it sarcastic names like “Kafr Ajab” (Wonder Village) and “Kafr Ghadab” (Anger Village). Today, the occupation completes this path with security campaigns and selective demolitions that “re-engineer” the place according to its needs.

Third, the occupation is moving towards consecrating the final separation of Hizma from Jerusalem, and pushing it to become an isolated rural area without a civilian center. If this policy is placed alongside what is happening in Khan al-Ahmar and the Jerusalem wilderness, and in Mikhmas and the surrounding Bedouin communities, and along the eastern extension of Ramallah, the picture suggests not only geographical isolation, but a broader exclusionary vision aimed at emptying the eastern extension of Jerusalem and Ramallah, and linking it to the project of Judaizing the Jordan Valley and the areas leading to it, and pushing Palestinians towards urban centers that can in turn be eliminated later.

In conclusion, Jerusalem has always been the mirror of the conflict with the Zionist project, and from it, intifadas and revolutions began. What its realities today tell us is that what comes after the war of extermination is not a calming, but a transition of the war from one form to another, and from one front to another. The war of liquidation is no longer content with slow progress, and it will not stop except with one of two ends: either it is met with an equivalent force that defeats the occupation's bet on its continuation, or it is left to reach its catastrophic goal, God forbid.

Under the weight of extermination, part of the Arab and Palestinian consciousness returned to raising the question of “Al-Aqsa Flood” and its utility, and even blaming the resistance for the crime. However, the real question, before and after the flood, is the same: How do we prevent liquidation? And how do we thwart the ongoing project of elimination with American partnership and official Arab and Islamic complicity? The flood, like the stations that preceded it, was not a cause for liquidation, but an attempt to disrupt it, and it succeeded temporarily. The challenge today is how to continue the struggle until despair is instilled in the consciousness of the Zionist project and its supporters of the possibility of achieving this decisive outcome, because overcoming this threshold alone is sufficient to move the conflict to an unprecedented stage, a stage in which the occupation loses its belief in the possibility of achieving its ideological ceilings.

Dr. Dalal Erekat: Real fear of administratively and politically separating the Gaza Strip from the West Bank under the guise of technocratic committees or transitional arrangements

Dr. Suhail Diab: The proposed plan under the title "Reconstruction of Gaza" intersects with the "Deal of the Century" and reflects the essence of the American approach to the Palestinian issue

Dr. Aql Salah: One of the most dangerous dimensions of the plan is the engineering of the Strip in the American way by carving out areas from it and maintaining Israeli control

Dr. Tamara Haddad: Kushner's plan is a political illusion and a financial trap and will lead to the geographical and demographic restructuring of the Gaza Strip and the entrenchment of the occupation's control

Dr. Jamal Harfoush: Kushner's proposal is a political illusion wrapped in economic discourse, and any reconstruction without a political solution remains temporary on land susceptible to destruction

Dr. Saeed Shaheen: The plan clearly reflects Trump's aspirations to control the Strip and seize its natural resources through the so-called "Peace Council"

Ramallah – Exclusive to "Al-Quds"-

The proposals presented by Jared Kushner, advisor to US President Donald Trump and his son-in-law, regarding the future of the Gaza Strip, raise warnings that they do not constitute a real path to reconstruction or peace, but rather represent an old re-production of the philosophy of "economic peace" within what is known as the "Deal of the Century" which previously failed.

Writers, political analysts, specialists, and university professors, in separate interviews with "Al-Quds", believe that despite the attractive language with which Kushner's plan is presented, and the investment and urban promises it carries, it ignores the essence of the war of extermination on the Gaza Strip, and lacks any political approach that guarantees national rights and Palestinian sovereignty.

Writers, specialists, and university professors believe that the greatest danger in this plan lies in its attempt to re-engineer the Palestinian reality, especially by passing an administrative and political separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, under the titles of technocratic committees or transitional arrangements that may turn into a permanent reality, while bypassing recognized Palestinian political representation, and legitimizing artificial alternatives managed economically and securely, at a moment of unprecedented national and humanitarian exhaustion, which opens the door to dangerous solutions by accepting partial solutions in exchange for stopping aggression or improving living conditions.

They point out that Kushner's plan clearly intersects with previous experiences, most notably the Manama conference and the Deal of the Century, in terms of prioritizing the economic dimension over the political, and using reconstruction as a tool of influence and guardianship, not as a humanitarian initiative. It also reveals a deep gap between the declared ideal vision and the reality on the ground in Gaza, represented by widespread destruction, continued Israeli security control, and the absence of any legal or political guarantees.

They affirm that, as such, the plan seems doomed to failure in advance, as it does not stem from ending the occupation or implementing international legitimacy, but rather perpetuates illusions of development and opens political and demographic traps that may deepen the crisis instead of solving it.

This reading comes as a report by NBC NEWS stated that Kushner's plan is unrealistic and seems to be from another world, given that a large part of the Gaza Strip is still destroyed due to more than two years of Israeli raids, and its residents often live in tents, and the occupation forces still occupy about half of the Strip.

Kushner had revealed plans to create a "new Gaza" filled with gleaming skyscrapers and crowded tourist beaches - a vision, according to the network, that is optimistic and starkly contrasts with the reality of a devastated region after two years of war.

An attempt to re-engineer the Palestinian reality

Dr. Dalal Erekat, Professor of Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution at the Arab American University, warns of the dangers of the proposal presented by Jared Kushner, the US President's envoy, regarding the Palestinian issue, considering that what has been presented since his dialogue at Harvard University goes beyond the concept of "economic peace" to a conscious attempt to re-engineer the Palestinian reality away from national political legitimacy and recognized Palestinian representation.

Erekat confirms that Kushner was "blunt and clear" in his direct targeting of the Palestinian Authority, as he does not view it as a political partner, but rather as a "functional obstacle" that must be overcome, which can be described as Kushner's political doctrine.

Legitimizing artificial alternatives

Erekat explains that Kushner's public criticisms of President Mahmoud Abbas and what he called the "old guard" are not part of normal political criticism, but rather constitute an entry point for demonizing the Palestinian leadership and legitimizing artificial alternatives, such as local "peace councils" or technocratic formulas directly linked to the proposed investment plan.

Erekat points out that Kushner used the discourse of "elite corruption" to link the expansion of settlements to what he described as the luxury of the Palestinian leadership, in an attempt to undermine the political ethics of the Palestinian negotiator, and to justify bypassing and circumventing the official leadership through direct communication with the private sector or technocratic figures, thereby emptying Palestinian political representation of its content.

A plan at a moment of unprecedented exhaustion

Erekat stresses that the greatest danger lies in what she called "de facto separation with Palestinian consent," considering that the proposal of what is known as "New Gaza" comes at a moment of unprecedented exhaustion experienced by Palestinians, which may push segments of them to accept any solution in exchange for stopping aggression.

Erekat explains that the real fear is the administrative and political separation of the Gaza Strip from the West Bank under the guise of technocratic committees or transitional arrangements, stressing that historical experience has proven that temporary solutions often turn into a permanent reality imposed on the ground.

The logic of the real estate developer

Erekat points out that Kushner deals with Gaza as an independent "real estate plot," using the logic of a real estate developer, with talk of investment projects and geographical connection with the West Bank in a purely economic formula, and with the participation of the private sector, without any sovereign or comprehensive national framework.

Regarding governance and property rights, Erekat confirms that the proposal ignores people and law, and does not address the rights of hundreds of thousands of owners of destroyed lands and homes, nor does it clarify how to organize the civil registry or protect the rights of citizens in the face of foreign investors. Erekat points out that the danger lies not only in Kushner's plan itself, but in the Palestinian drift, under the pressure of war and siege, towards solutions that divide geography and end unified political representation in exchange for promises of prosperity without legal or political guarantees.

The essence of the American approach to the Palestinian issue

Political science professor Dr. Suhail Diab confirms that Jared Kushner's plan, recently presented in Davos under the title "Reconstruction of Gaza," clearly intersects with the experience of the Manama conference in 2019 and what was then known as the "Deal of the Century," pointing to three essential common elements between the two proposals that reflect the essence of the American approach to the Palestinian issue.

Diab explains that the first of these elements is the almost complete reliance on the economic dimension, without presenting any clear political approach to the future of governance in the Gaza Strip, whether it concerns self-rule, Palestinian sovereignty, or an independent state, stressing that ignoring the political dimension was not a coincidence, which explains the continuous Palestinian rejection of these proposals from the Deal of the Century until today.

The second common element, according to Diab, is the re-production of a traditional American pattern based on considering economic development as a central solution to complex political crises, with complete disregard for the essential political elements of the conflict, including its historical roots and Palestinian national rights, which makes these plans detached from the real reality of the conflict.

Diab points out that the third element is the deep gap between the "ideal" vision promoted by these plans and the reality on the ground in the Gaza Strip, considering that this gap constitutes the primary incubator for the illusions and traps inherent in such projects.

Reconstruction of Gaza to deepen its political influence

Despite these commonalities, Diab believes that Kushner's plan in Davos reflects a clearer and more dangerous level compared to the Manama plan, as the United States is no longer content with proposing reconstruction as an economic path, but rather seeks to use the reconstruction of Gaza as a lever to deepen its political influence, leading to a kind of guardianship and control over the Strip.

Diab points out that what was absent in the Deal of the Century regarding a political vision for the administration of Gaza is now being formulated through talk of governance and direct American influence.

Diab affirms that the Davos project is not presented as a humanitarian initiative for reconstruction as much as it is used as a tool for regional and international political influence.

Possibility of the plan's success under conditions

Regarding the chances of the plan's success, Diab explains that it is theoretically possible only if four basic conditions are met: a permanent ceasefire, removal of rubble and mines, provision of massive financial capital, and establishment of a clear institutional structure for governance.

However, these conditions, according to Diab, are not currently available, and there are not even serious beginnings to achieve them, especially in the absence of a stable security reality controlled by Israel, and the absence of the necessary Palestinian legitimacy to involve the residents of the Gaza Strip in any such project, for which the United States bears political responsibility.

Diab emphasizes that the discussion is not only about economic illusions, but about political traps related to regional and international power balances, and dependent on the regional trajectory and escalation probabilities, and on the direction of the international system, whether towards renewed American hegemony or towards a multipolar world, which will directly reflect on how the Palestinian issue in general and the Gaza Strip in particular are dealt with.

A theoretical proposal that contradicts the reality on the ground

Writer, political researcher, and professor of comparative political systems, Dr. Aql Salah, considers Jared Kushner's plan for the Gaza Strip not a practical, implementable plan, but rather a theoretical proposal that fundamentally contradicts the existing reality on the ground, politically and security-wise, describing it as "false bourgeois promises" that serve American and Israeli goals and have no connection to a radical solution to the Palestinian issue.

Salah explains that the plan is directly linked to the agenda of US President Donald Trump, who views Gaza as an area for collecting billions and controlling gas wealth off its coast. Salah points out that the plan is marketed internationally as an incentive plan to attract support and investments, but at the level of the Gaza Strip, it is not feasible, because its proponents are driven by specific investment and financial goals, completely separate from the reality of the occupation and the requirements of a just political solution.

Replacing international references

Salah explains that the essence of the plan is to replace international references and resolutions of international legitimacy, which stipulate an end to the occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state, with an economic approach aimed at covering up the continuation of the Israeli occupation and whitewashing its image before the international community.

Salah confirms that the plan has several overlapping goals, including an economic goal represented by American investment, a political goal represented by legitimizing the occupation, in addition to another goal of improving Israel's international image, leading to a goal related to saving the head of the occupation government, Benjamin Netanyahu, from prosecution and international pressure.

Engineering Gaza the American way

Salah points out that one of the most dangerous dimensions of the plan is the engineering of the Gaza Strip in the American way, by carving out large areas from it and maintaining Israeli control over them, which means transforming Gaza into a truncated entity, and depriving it of its agricultural areas that were an essential element in achieving self-sufficiency.

He affirms that Kushner's plan, old and renewed, is based on imposing an "economic solution" as an alternative to a political solution, and enabling the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which constitutes the essence of the conspiracy against the sacrifices of the Palestinian people, especially in the Gaza Strip.

Salah refers to the experience of the "Manama Plan" in 2019, which Kushner promoted under the name "Peace to Prosperity" with a value of 50 billion dollars, and which practically aimed to end the two-state solution, noting that this plan did not achieve economic peace, prosperity, or a political solution. Salah confirms that Kushner returned in 2026 with the same logic, by proposing to transform Gaza into "Palestine's Dubai," in an attempt to transform the conflict from a national liberation issue into an issue of services and economic well-being.

Salah warns that the new plan seeks to replace the so-called "Peace Council," headed by Trump, with international law, the United Nations and its agencies, especially UNRWA, in a step aimed at liquidating the refugee issue and the right of return, and linking all of this to the Deal of the Century and the "Abraham Accords," by using economic and humanitarian pressure in Gaza to impose an economic solution that ends any prospect of a just political solution.

The philosophy of "economic peace"

Writer and political researcher Dr. Tamara Haddad warns of the danger of Jared Kushner's proposal regarding the future of the Gaza Strip, considering that it does not constitute a peace or reconstruction project as much as it is a re-production of the philosophy of "economic peace" previously put forward at the Manama conference, which proved its complete political and national failure.

According to Haddad, Kushner is re-marketing the Manama experience in a new language, combining urban development, investment, and financing, but without addressing the essence of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is the occupation.

Haddad explains that the proposed vision deals with Gaza as an investment and real estate file, not as a matter of liberation and political rights, pointing out that transforming the Strip into a "real estate deal" serves the interests of companies and individuals with commercial backgrounds, led by Kushner and his partners, and does not respond to the rights or national aspirations of Palestinians.

Completely neutralizing the political dimension

Haddad explains that the most dangerous aspect of this plan is the complete neutralization of the political dimension, and the end of any talk about Palestinian sovereignty, geographical borders, or ending the occupation, in exchange for presenting economics as an alternative to rights.

Haddad confirms that this approach was the essence of the Manama conference, which did not produce peace, nor did it improve the living reality of Palestinians, but rather contributed to marginalizing their political rights and denying their national existence.

Regarding the reality on the ground, Haddad explains that Kushner's plan ignores the fact that the Gaza Strip is almost completely destroyed, and that the occupation controls more than half of its area, under a continuous siege, and the absence of any real political horizon.

Haddad points out that talk of transitional phases is not based on American guarantees or Israeli commitments, which practically means consecrating a temporary phase that turns into a permanent one, with continued Israeli military control.

Extremely dangerous demographic dimensions

Haddad notes that the plan includes extremely dangerous demographic dimensions, as it specifies the population numbers in the main cities of the Strip, such as Gaza City, Rafah, and Khan Yunis, which practically means reducing the Palestinian population and opening the door to large-scale displacement.

Haddad considers that this trend constitutes the essence of the plan, which aims to reduce Palestinian demography under the guise of reconstruction and investment.

Popular rejection of imposed structures

Haddad confirms that the Palestinian street in Gaza shows no satisfaction with the proposals related to the "Peace Council," the "Executive Council," or the "Administrative Committee," as they are viewed as structures imposed by American-Israeli pressure and with the support of regional parties, without real Palestinian consensus or representation.

Haddad explains that the state of popular doubt and rejection is increasing, amid a growing conviction that the ultimate goal is displacement, not reconstruction.

Haddad confirms that what Kushner is proposing is nothing but a mixture of political illusion and financial trap, based on collecting money from donors, especially Gulf countries, to transfer the burden of Gaza's destruction from the occupation to the international community, while Palestinians remain the victims, warning that the continuation of this path will lead to the geographical and demographic restructuring of Gaza, and the entrenchment of the occupation's control, instead of ending it.

Ignoring the essence of the conflict

Professor of Scientific Research Methods and Political Studies at the Academic Research Center University in Brazil, Dr. Jamal Harfoush, confirms that the position expressed by an American media outlet regarding the failure of Jared Kushner's experience in the Gaza Strip cannot be understood in isolation from Kushner's previous experience at the Manama conference in 2019, which formed the economic cornerstone of what was then known as the "Deal of the Century."

Harfoush explains that the most important implication in the current proposal lies in the re-production of the same approach that Kushner previously adopted, based on separating economics from politics, development from rights, and reconstruction from sovereignty.

Harfoush points out that the Manama conference offered billions of dollars as an alternative to ending the occupation, and dealt with the Palestinian issue as a living crisis that could be solved through investment, not a national liberation issue and inalienable rights, which led to political and moral failure and widespread Palestinian rejection, due to its disregard for the essence of the conflict, which is the occupation, land, sovereignty, and the right to self-determination.

Harfoush confirms that the current proposal for what is called "New Gaza" reflects the same logic, but with a different urban facade, explaining that in Manama, money without a state was promoted, and in Gaza, there is talk of towers without sovereignty, and in both cases, there is a deliberate absence of the real Palestinian actor. Harfoush considers that the danger lies in the fact that the new proposal is more abstract from reality than the Manama conference itself, especially since Gaza today is not only under occupation and siege, but destroyed, stripped of infrastructure, burdened with rubble and unexploded ordnance, and its people live in harsh humanitarian conditions in tents.

A political illusion wrapped in economic discourse

Harfoush confirms that what is being presented today can be described as a political illusion wrapped in attractive economic discourse, and it may turn into a double trap.

The first trap, according to Harfoush, is the illusion of feasibility, where there is talk of billions of dollars in GDP, ports, airports, and towers, while ignoring documented facts, most notably the presence of more than 60 million tons of rubble, and the need for years to remove debris and clear ordnance, in addition to the absence of Palestinian control over borders, sea, and air, and the continued occupation of large parts of the Strip.

The second trap, according to Harfoush, lies in financing without political guarantees, as Harfoush warns against attracting international funds without a clear commitment to ending the occupation and without guaranteeing Palestinian sovereignty over the land and projects, which transforms money from a rescue tool into a crisis management tool.

Harfoush points out that any reconstruction that is not preceded or accompanied by a real political solution remains temporary reconstruction on land susceptible to re-destruction.

Attractive media language without political content

Professor of Political Media at Hebron University, Dr. Saeed Shaheen, considers that the plan presented by Jared Kushner during the Davos forum last week appears "beautiful and ambitious" from a marketing and media perspective, but in its essence, it lacks any real political content that guarantees the future of the residents of the Gaza Strip and their national rights, warning that it is nothing more than ink on paper.

Shaheen explains that the plan was drafted in attractive media language that suggests to those who do not know the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that the residents of Gaza, who are facing a continuous war of extermination at varying rates, will be rewarded with a prosperous future full of opportunities and hope.

Ignoring the future of Palestinians

However, the plan, according to Shaheen, completely ignores the political future of Palestinians, and does not include any reference to their right to liberation, ending dependence on the occupation, or even international guardianship, but rather carries in its hidden details what deprives them of their rights and eliminates any national horizon.

Shaheen points out that the plan clearly reflects US President Donald Trump's aspirations to control the Gaza Strip and seize its natural resources, through the so-called "Peace Council," which has so far met only a small part of the Gaza Strip's humanitarian needs, while maintaining the main goal of the war, which is to eliminate any threat to Israel, and complete security control over the details of Palestinian life through a joint American-Israeli command room.

Shaheen explains that Israel seeks, through this plan, to impose permanent security control and keep large areas of the Strip empty, to ensure what it describes as the security of its southern borders, under international cover and UN resolutions, while the plan is promoted as a reconstruction project.

Investment profits under the guise of reconstruction

Shaheen explains that the financial aspect of the plan is based on collecting funds in the name of reconstruction, while in practice it aims to generate investment profits, especially in the real estate sector, owned primarily by Trump and his son-in-law, not by the residents of Gaza.

Shaheen warns that the plan aims to end any possibility of a viable Palestinian state or achieving geographical connection with the West Bank, where a parallel plan is being implemented to entrench Israeli control.

Shaheen stresses that any plan that does not start from ending the occupation in accordance with international legitimacy and its resolutions remains sterile, emphasizing that what is being promoted today is nothing but political illusions that pave the way for the completion of Israeli control over the entire Palestinian land and the imposition of a permanent fait accompli.

The Middle East region these days stands on the brink of an abyss amidst the increasing American military buildup around Iran, and Iran's warnings of the repercussions of any aggression or war launched against it, regardless of its level, degree, and objectives. This brink is the most dangerous since the American-Israeli conflict with Iran began in 1979 after the victory of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, which brought about comprehensive changes in thought, politics, economy, culture, and social life. The forty-seven years of this conflict and animosity have witnessed constant tensions, continuous charging, and unceasing mobilization, reaching a shadow war between Israel and Iran, represented by drone attacks on commercial ships, explosions in ports, assassinations of scientists, and attacks on centers, targets, leaders, and figures in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere, and supporting opponents of Israel with money, training, and expertise, leading to Iran's completion of its peaceful nuclear project, which began during the time of the deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and was frozen for a period before modern Iran resumed and completed it during the time of the late Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, based on its right to obtain peaceful nuclear energy, like other countries seeking progress and development in accordance with international agreements and global conditions.

Iran's insistence on acquiring nuclear energy was and still is the biggest concern for Israel, the United States, and Western powers in general. This growing and escalating concern is due to the complex of annihilation that Jews suffered in World War II at the hands of Nazism. To illustrate the depth of this complex, it is enough to recall what Netanyahu did when he won the second elections in 1999, where he visited the Israeli army headquarters the next day to review plans to strike Iran, and then said a few days later in a speech to the Knesset that "he will not allow a second annihilation of the Jewish people," in addition to Israel's great concern about being surrounded by armed forces loyal to Iran in southern Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria before the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime, and General Qassem Soleimani's project, which was working on a long-term strategic project to encircle Israel with a million missiles in Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza. What happened on October 7th contributes to the fears of the aforementioned complex, and the violent, harsh, and unprecedented Israeli reaction is nothing but a huge expression of fear of reaching a state that approximates and resembles the "annihilation" complex, even if on a smaller scale.

In light of this, the scope of the Israeli response to what happened on October 7th was wider than its geographical space in the Gaza Strip; rather, it expanded to include Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The aggression against Iran on June 13th of last year, despite the security surprise that counts in Israel's favor, the twelve-day war map carried a clear indicator that Israel cannot continue this war for a longer period, because the attrition in it is more painful and agonizing for the Israeli side than it is for the Iranian side. Therefore, the United States intervened with a supporting strike, which involved raiding some important facilities in the nuclear project, and then retreated and withdrew Israel under the umbrella of a ceasefire.

Today, after seven months of this confrontation, during which the Iranian side worked to restore its internal security situation, and accelerate the filling of military gaps revealed by the war, by purchasing advanced warplanes, air defense systems, and developing and compensating ballistic and hypersonic missiles, rapidly and continuously, and maintaining the Iranian position rejecting all conditions diplomatically requested from it, which include zeroing enrichment, shortening the ranges of ballistic and hypersonic missiles, stopping support for resistance forces in the region, and not resolving the issue of the amount of enriched uranium it possesses except in the event of a comprehensive, balanced agreement, all these Iranian positions and others clashed with the new American approach seeking to implement Trump's electoral slogans with an expansive and urgent mechanism that does not wait for delay, the essence of which is the fear of the American administration, led by Trump, that the United States will lose its global position in the face of China's and Russia's growth and global expansion, and the emergence of blocs such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that threaten the unipolarity of the United States economically and politically. Therefore, the approach towards Iran with mobilization, siege, and the threat of war and regime change does not allow the luxury of time for diplomacy to defuse the crisis, and thus the war will be faster than we imagine, and greater than politicians and analysts expect, because the list of programs that Trump seeks to achieve during his remaining three years in power is large and crowded, and faces visible living obstacles, and unexpected obstacles.

The goal of the war will be primarily to overthrow the regime, completing what happened with Venezuela and its president Maduro. This goal in Iran may require great force and wide stages of fire, and days, weeks, and months of fighting, beyond Trump's and Netanyahu's estimates, because this war is not intended for Iran only, but for China and Russia, as if Iran constitutes the knot that stands in Washington's way towards the South China Sea, and the borders of Russia and Croatia. Thus, the keys to the war cannot be controlled by the Americans and Israelis because the military ambiguity practiced by Iran makes both the American and Israeli sides, despite their insistence on getting rid of this Iranian regime as an urgent need, in anxiety and hesitation, and even a lack of clear foresight of the results of this war and its consequences.

The Americans, and behind them the Israelis and Westerners, have grown weary of the Iranian situation that has defied them throughout the past five decades, and the time has come, according to their estimates, to close this file completely, in light of this wave of changes the world is witnessing at the hands of Trump and his ambitions for control and dominance. But what Trump and Netanyahu behind him do not want to solve, or both are unable to solve, is the cipher of Iran's Islamic Revolution that enabled Iran to stand firm and challenge for almost five decades, despite the siege and sanctions that no one in history has been subjected to in such quantity and duration, and the level of progress and status that Tehran has reached at the regional and global levels, whether military, economic, or scientific. Therefore, with the inevitability of war, it is impossible to predict the endings, or control the mechanisms, threads, and scope of the coming military conflict, which in my opinion, Iran will control most, and utilize to thwart the war's objectives, and even brake the Trumpian impulse towards dominance and control and the re-establishment of the modern face of colonialism, dependency, and the plundering of peoples' resources.

US President Donald Trump said on Thursday that current indications "appear to be leading to the disarmament of the Hamas movement," as the second phase of the US-brokered Gaza ceasefire agreement began. However, this statement was quickly met with opposing and explicit statements from the movement's leaders, who categorically denied any commitment or readiness to abandon their weapons, reflecting the fragility and political and security complexities of the upcoming phase.

Trump's remarks came during a cabinet meeting at the White House, where he spoke confidently about post-ceasefire developments, saying: "Many said they would never disarm, but it looks like they will." The US President praised what he described as "tangible cooperation" following the recovery of the remains of the last Israeli hostage held in Gaza, Ran Gvili, considering this step to be "the closure of a highly sensitive humanitarian file" and the opening of a new door in the path to settlement.

This statement coincided with the US administration's official announcement of transitioning to what it calls "Phase Two" of its Gaza plan, a phase that goes beyond solidifying the ceasefire to addressing the core issues of the conflict, primarily the disarmament of Hamas, restructuring the security situation in the Strip, and initiating a large-scale reconstruction process under international supervision.

According to American officials, Phase Two involves Hamas handing over its heavy and medium weapons under international supervision, followed by the deployment of a multinational security force to maintain security and prevent the return of armed factions to military action. The plan also includes the establishment of a Washington-backed transitional body, named the "Peace Council," to oversee the administration of Gaza, coordinate aid, and reconstruction, until a final governance formula is reached.

However, this American optimism did not find a similar echo within the Hamas movement. Prominent officials in the movement affirmed, in statements to regional media, that the issue of disarmament is "completely rejected" and "non-negotiable," stressing that weapons represent the "essence of resistance" and a fundamental guarantee in confronting Israel. They added that any talk of a political settlement cannot begin with disarming Palestinians of their means of defense, but rather with ending the occupation and achieving national rights.

Hamas accused the US administration of attempting to impose political and security realities by force and threats, instead of reaching balanced understandings. Its leaders considered that Washington is "confusing temporary calm with political surrender," which the movement will not accept, according to them.

In contrast, Trump and his special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, have repeatedly hinted at harsh measures if Hamas refuses to comply with the disarmament demand. Witkoff had previously stated that the movement would face a "heavy price" if it violated the understandings, affirming the readiness of the United States and its allies to take direct steps to enforce disarmament by force if necessary.

Although the US administration has not revealed details of the implementation mechanisms or the nature of potential "punitive measures," observers suggest that these could include renewed military pressure, targeted strikes, and tightened economic sanctions, in coordination with Israel and regional partners. Washington believes that any post-war arrangements will remain fragile unless Hamas's military capabilities are fully dismantled.

The proposed "Peace Council," in turn, has raised Palestinian and regional reservations. While Washington says it will include international figures and technocratic experts to manage civil affairs, critics argue that excluding Hamas without a consensual political alternative could exacerbate Palestinian division and lack popular legitimacy within Gaza.

Regionally, Egypt and Qatar, two of the most prominent mediators, adopted a cautious stance, welcoming continued calm without confirming claims of disarmament. European diplomats also called for not anticipating results, stressing that political statements are not enough without verifiable practical steps on the ground.

So far, there have been no tangible indications that Hamas has begun to surrender its weapons or dismantle its military structure, despite relative progress in delivering humanitarian aid and initiating preliminary consultations on reconstruction.

Trump, however, affirmed that "the momentum is moving in the right direction," considering that Phase Two could constitute a historic turning point for Gaza and the entire region. But the gap between American rhetoric and Hamas's categorical denial leaves the scene open to multiple possibilities, ranging from a forced settlement to a new explosion of conflict.

According to experts, Trump's optimism about Hamas's disarmament reflects an American desire to market Phase Two as a political and security achievement, rather than an accurate description of reality. Previous experiences confirm that disarming ideological movements without a clear political horizon or national guarantees often ends in failure. Moreover, military pressure alone may reproduce a cycle of violence, instead of dismantling its root causes.

In contrast, others believe that Hamas is using public denial as a bargaining chip, to maintain its internal cohesion and avoid appearing defeated. But continued ambiguity may put the movement in difficult choices, especially if American pressure is accompanied by broader regional consensus. In the absence of a comprehensive political settlement, Hamas's weapons will remain a symbol of a conflict whose features have not yet been decided.

Special Report

Indications are increasing that a US military strike against Iran is approaching, amid a large US military buildup in the Middle East, escalating rhetoric from US President Donald Trump, and intensive security consultations with Israel and regional allies. Despite no official decision for an attack, data suggests that Washington is preparing the conditions for rapid military actions should the diplomatic path falter according to American priorities.

According to sources familiar with US defense planning, the Pentagon has prepared operational scenarios relying on strategic bombers and precision munitions (cruise missiles) to target Iranian command and control centers, especially in and around Tehran, with the aim of paralyzing Iran's ability to manage any potential military response.

This escalation reflects a broader shift in the Trump administration's approach to Iran, as the focus is no longer limited to the nuclear file, but now includes seeking to change Iranian political behavior internally and regionally. In this context, a source familiar with the US administration's thinking told Al-Quds correspondent in Washington: "The United States wants to see a radical change in Iran's political behavior."

The source explained that the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018, which he was familiar with, came within a broader vision within the Trump administration, and said: "During Trump's first administration, it was not primarily about withdrawing from the nuclear agreement with Iran, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the agreement reached in Vienna, Austria in 2015), but rather most of Trump's advisors, such as Bolton (National Security Advisor), Kelly (White House Chief of Staff), Pompeo (Secretary of State), McMaster (National Security Advisor) and others, aimed to change the regime in Tehran," adding: "The withdrawal from the nuclear agreement would have allowed the Trump administration at that time to implement a policy of maximum pressure, impose suffocating sanctions on Iran, and ban the sale of Iranian oil, leading to the collapse of the government."

Despite these tendencies, Washington in Trump's first term refrained from launching a direct military strike or strikes against Iran, for internal political reasons. The source said: "Essentially, Trump was focused on winning a second term in 2020, and military strikes or entering a new war were unpopular with his base of (MAGA) supporters, as well as with traditional conservatives in the Republican Party at the time."

However, these calculations, according to the source, have changed today. He added: "Now the situation is different; Trump is no longer, to some extent, constrained by his MAGA base. He struck Iran last June, and that did not lead to any major division within the party or within his base, despite their dissatisfaction with military adventures - recently, Trump attacked the Venezuelan capital Caracas, and arrested Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and imprisoned him in New York without divisions within the party."

Regarding the reasons for this renewed American obsession with Iran, the source explained to Al-Quds correspondent that the matter "is not part of a special obsession of President Donald Trump, as all successive US administrations since Jimmy Carter's administration in 1979 have been in a state of confrontation with Tehran, which since the Islamic Revolution has been a constant source of annoyance, and a thorn in the side of American presidents." He added that "the United States seeks to make the Middle East safe for Israel and its other allies; and to make it safe for the flow of oil without disturbances or obstacles." The source continued that "the thinking (within the administration) is that the war on Gaza and its regional repercussions have weakened Iran and its allies in the region, which leads Trump to believe that the moment is opportune to push the Iranian regime towards collapse."

Regionally, security assessments indicate that Israel will have a direct role in any confrontation led by the United States against Iran. Israeli officials have consistently affirmed that Iranian military and nuclear capabilities pose an existential threat, while security coordination between Washington and Tel Aviv has escalated in recent weeks. At the same time, sources reported that Jordan is preparing to participate in defensive missions, especially in intercepting potential Iranian missiles or drones directed at Israel, as happened in April 2024 and June 2025, amid increasing coordination with Washington. In this context, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a high-level security meeting to discuss a file described in the Israeli media as "secret," focusing on Iran and the possibility of an American strike and its repercussions, especially a potential Iranian response.

This comes amid intense diplomatic activity involving Washington, Moscow, and Tehran, while Iran announced its readiness to display its naval power, warning of a broad response to any American attack. Trump has publicly linked the threat of military action to both Iran's nuclear program and the bloody suppression of recent protests, which, according to human rights organizations, resulted in thousands of deaths.

In this context, a senior American official told Israeli media that a presidential decision authorizing military strikes could be issued within days, once the deployment of American forces in the region is complete, which raises concerns about the American-Iranian confrontation approaching a very dangerous stage.

What happened falls within a broader pattern of restrictions affecting Palestinian content on digital platforms.

Washington – Said Arikat

News Analysis

US President Donald Trump on Wednesday launched one of his most threatening messages towards Iran since his return to the White House, warning that "time is running out" for Tehran to reach a new nuclear agreement, and announcing that a "massive military fleet" led by the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln is on its way to the region, in a clear indication of Washington's readiness to resort to force if diplomatic efforts fail.

In a post on his "Truth Social" platform on Wednesday, January 28, Trump called on the Iranian leadership to "immediately sit down at the negotiating table" to reach an agreement that prevents the acquisition of nuclear weapons, warning that any future American strike would be "more severe and widespread" than previous operations targeting Iranian facilities. His statements came at a highly sensitive regional and international moment, where nuclear issues intersect with escalating internal unrest in Iran, and security tensions threatening the stability of the entire Middle East.

Goals Beyond the Nuclear File

However, behind the public rhetoric focusing on preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, leaks from decision-making circles in Washington reveal a broader approach. According to informed American sources, Trump is considering limited military options aimed not only at deterrence, but at "creating internal political conditions that could lead to a change in the structure of Iranian rule," as the Al-Quds correspondent in Washington learned. These options include precise strikes targeting security units linked to the suppression of protests, in an attempt to weaken the regime's grip and fuel popular discontent.

This vision reflects a conviction among some hawks in the US administration that the Iranian regime is going through an unprecedented phase of fragility, due to the suffocating economic crisis, international isolation, and the widening scope of popular protests, making external pressure a catalyst for deeper internal fissures.

Iran Responds: No Negotiation Under Threat

In contrast, the Iranian response was swift and sharp. Tehran, through its Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, affirmed that any negotiation under threat is completely rejected, warning that the Iranian armed forces are "at the highest levels of readiness," and that any American attack will be met with an "immediate and harsh" response.

High-ranking Iranian officials stressed that any strike, no matter how limited, would be considered a declaration of war, and could lead to responses extending beyond the Iranian arena, to include American and allied interests in the region. This was accompanied by media escalation and political messages expressing Tehran's readiness to bear the cost of confrontation, rather than succumbing to what it describes as "the policy of dictates."

The Region on the Brink of Explosion

The American escalation against Iran has increased the pace of concern in the region. While both Israel and Saudi Arabia intensified their consultations with Washington regarding potential scenarios, other Gulf states expressed clear reservations about any military action that could drag the region into an open war, refusing the use of their territories or airspace in any potential attack.

At the same time, Russia warned of the risks of sliding into a comprehensive military confrontation, calling for diplomacy to be given a last chance, while European countries expressed concern about the repercussions of any escalation on global energy security and the stability of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

Economic and Security Repercussions

The signs of these repercussions have already begun to appear, as oil prices witnessed a significant rise, amidst fears of supply disruptions in the event of a military confrontation. International airlines have also rerouted their flights away from the Middle East airspace, indicating increasing concern about security risks.

As for financial markets, they recorded a state of volatility, with investors moving towards safe havens, given the geopolitical uncertainty.

Complex Calculations

Despite the escalation, the scene remains open to more than one possibility. The US administration is threatening force, but at the same time affirms that the door has not been completely closed to negotiation. As for Iran, it rejects the threat, but leaves a window ajar for an agreement "based on mutual respect," according to its officials.

The most prominent question remains: Do these mutual pressures constitute a prelude to a new political settlement, or do they lead the region towards one of the most dangerous confrontations in its modern history?

The American escalation towards Iran reflects a strategic shift that goes beyond the logic of traditional deterrence to an attempt to influence the internal balances of the Iranian regime. However, betting on "changing behavior" or "creating conditions for political change" through military pressure carries serious risks, as external threats often unite internal fronts instead of dismantling them. In contrast, Iran seems caught between refusing to submit and the need to alleviate suffocating economic pressures. Between these two options, the region stands on the brink of an explosion whose outcomes no one may be able to control, making diplomacy, despite its fragility, the best option according to experts.

The Egyptian side adheres to the principle of balance between the number of arrivals and departures through the crossing.

Health: Five martyrs, including a child pulled from under the rubble, arrived at hospitals.

Dr. Ibrahim Neirat

What is being prepared for the Gaza Strip today is not mismanagement, nor a failed international endeavor, nor even an “incomplete solution” imposed by circumstances. What is happening is a complete, integrated, and gradual political project, whose ultimate goal is not to end the war or alleviate suffering, but to redefine the Palestinian issue: from a national liberation cause to a long-term humanitarian file, and from a struggle for sovereignty to a matter of population management.

The danger here lies not in the declared intentions, but in the guaranteed outcomes. Every path begins with temporary administration and ends with a permanent arrangement. And all talk of “phased approaches,” “realism,” and “lack of alternatives” is merely linguistic cover for entrenching the model of Gaza without sovereignty as a starting point for re-engineering the entire Palestinian scene.

What makes matters worse is that this transformation does not occur through an explicit declaration, but through gradual arrangements framed in the language of “necessity,” “alleviation,” and “humanitarian urgency.”

What is called the “Trump Peace Council” (the council launched within the White House framework and promoting alternative arrangements that address the “cost” instead of the “occupation”) does not represent a fleeting deviation in American policy, but rather the culmination of a long process that considers the problem not to be the occupation, but the cost of the occupation. And when the goal becomes reducing the cost, not ending the cause, the natural result is to search for arrangements that maintain control and reduce responsibility. Gaza, besieged, exhausted, and divided, is presented today as the ideal testing ground for this model.

More dangerous than the project itself is the silent adaptation to it. History is not liquidated by force alone, but by gradualism, by implicit acceptance, and by surrender called rationality. When the Palestinian leadership does not openly reject, does not set clear limits, and does not take political initiative, it is not “buying time,” but letting time work against it.

The Palestinian leadership might say it lacks the ability to confront. This is true. But it undoubtedly possesses the ability to prevent, to obstruct, to raise the cost, and to refuse to be a false witness to the liquidation of its cause. The inability to impose a solution does not justify accepting the cancellation of a solution. And the difference between political realism and political suicide is a difference of will, not a difference of power.

The most dangerous thing that can happen now is the transformation of Gaza into an entity managed with a separate budget, special legal rules, independent security arrangements, and long-term reconstruction contracts that do not pass through the Palestinian authority (the Palestinian government, the executive authority, and accredited official bodies). This is not a “solution for Gaza,” but a final separation for it. And anyone who thinks that this separation will stop at Gaza is either deluded or complicit in deception. The West Bank is simultaneously left to settlement and creeping annexation, while the Palestinian Authority is emptied of its political content and reduced to an administrative function without sovereignty or horizon.

Acquiescence to what the United States is leading at this stage is not pragmatism, but an open mandate to liquidate the Palestinian issue with soft tools. Washington is not looking for a just solution, nor even a balanced solution, but for a stable arrangement at the lowest possible cost to itself and to Israel. The more Palestinians accept this logic, the more they become the cost that must be reduced.

What is needed is not angry statements, nor high-flown speeches, but decisive and clear political actions. Any talk of reconstruction must be immediately linked to a written legal definition of the status of the Gaza Strip. Any administration must be time-bound and have a clear termination mechanism. Any party that takes over the administration of the Strip outside the Palestinian framework must bear full legal and humanitarian responsibility, without Palestinian cover, and without a formal partnership that is later used to blame Palestinians for failure.

It must also be stated clearly: contracts concluded outside the Palestinian authority will not be binding in the future. Not out of revenge, but in defense of the idea of a state. For reconstruction built upon the denial of sovereignty does not restore life, but entrenches defeat.

Internally, the most dangerous thing that can be allowed is the emergence of alternative legitimacies managed in the name of “reality.” Any circumvention of the national authority opens the door to the collapse of what remains of the Palestinian political system. And division, however deep, does not grant anyone the right to redefine Palestinian representation or bypass it. Silence here is not neutrality, but participation in dismantling.

Time, which some are betting on to overcome this stage, is not neutral. Time is either managed, or it turns into a slow crushing tool. And every day that passes without legal and procedural control over what is being prepared for Gaza brings us one step closer to a reality where statements of regret or speeches of “if only we had known” will be of no use.

This is not an ordinary moment, nor one of the repeated failures. This is a moment of final redefinition. Gaza without sovereignty today means Palestine without a state tomorrow. And whoever thinks that history will exempt the silent has not read the history of this issue.

The question is no longer: Do we have the ability to win?

The real question is: Do we have the will to prevent defeat before it becomes a fait accompli?

From Diagnosis to Plan: Decisive Steps for the Palestinian Authority

If this reading is accurate, the Palestinian Authority does not have the luxury of “monitoring” or “waiting.” An immediate action plan is required to prevent the establishment of the Gaza without sovereignty model, as follows:

• Conditional Acceptance of Reconstruction and Stability
• The Authority does not reject reconstruction, but it rejects its transformation into an alternative to sovereignty.
  Acceptance is only under clear conditions:
  • A written legal definition of Gaza's status,
  • Identification of the administering body and responsibilities,
  • A timeframe for ending any temporary administration.
• Establishing Red Lines That Cannot Be Crossed

Without declaring a confrontation, the Authority must establish:• Non-acceptance of permanent or open-ended administration outside Palestinian sovereignty.• Rejection of independent budgets or financial systems.• Rejection of any reconstruction or investment contracts that do not pass through the Palestinian government.• Rejection of using the Authority as legal cover.

• Preventing Illegitimate Administrative and Financial Cooperation

• Stopping any official dealings with projects or entities operating outside the government.• Non-acceptance of funding that goes directly to Gaza without passing through accredited frameworks.

• Activating Legal Prevention

Sending legal memoranda to the United Nations and donors confirming that:• Any administration outside Palestinian sovereignty bears international legal responsibility.• Any contracts outside the Palestinian framework are not binding in the future.

• Preserving the Unity of the Palestinian System

Preventing structural separation through:• A single budget,• A unified civil registry,• A unified legal and financial system.

• Managing the Relationship with Washington with a Logic of Cost, Not Confrontation

The Authority is not an adversary, but a less costly option.A clear message must be sent: bypassing the Authority does not accelerate the solution, but makes Gaza a long-term American burden.

• Preventing the Emergence of Alternative Legitimacies within Gaza

Non-recognition of any transitional structures or “local administration” outside the national framework.Division is not a justification for bypassing the Palestinian authority.

• Managing Time as a Pressure Tool

The Authority does not rush into full engagement if the conditions for sovereignty are not met, and keeps the door open to raise the cost on the bypassing parties over time.

If these steps are not taken now, Gaza will become the model upon which “Palestine without a state” is built.And this is not a warning but a reality about to be imposed.

The question is not: Can we win?The question is: Do we have the will to prevent defeat before it turns into reality?