It seems that the stagnation of the situation has begun to raise many questions about Israel's intention and the readiness of its army and its ability to achieve the ambitious goals of the war set by the political leadership, and about the realism of these goals and the possibility of achieving them in the first place and how to get down from the tree of these lofty goals.

It was clear from the beginning that the Israeli statements about “crushing Hamas” and “wiping out Hamas” were a spontaneous reaction motivated by revenge for the recent painful blow it dealt to Israel, and that they were not based on rational and realistic thinking and were not based on a post-Hamas political plan in the Gaza Strip. It is also not based on a realistic military plan capable of carrying out this mission.

In the midst of the atmosphere of “against them” that swept the Israeli arena, some voices could be found that warned against this rush and saw that revenge was not a strategy. Some of them even mocked the threats of “crushing,” “crushing,” and “terminating,” recalling that they were repetitive. This was echoed by statements made by the same leaders since 2008, some of whom believed that the issue of eliminating Hamas was not possible, because it is an idea, an ideology, and a religious-social movement that permeates the structure of Palestinian society.

Today, after 18 days of deadly and devastating aerial bombardment that turned into a war of genocide and displacement, we hear that the Biden administration fears that Israel has no military objectives and is not ready for a ground attack supported by a practical plan, and that the US Secretary of Defense urges his Israeli counterpart on the necessity of conducting a careful review of the plan. Ground entry into the Gaza Strip.

Senior officials indicated that the US administration is concerned that the Israeli army has no way to implement the goal set by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to eliminate the authority of Hamas. Senior officials who have been in telephone contact with their Israeli counterparts since October 7 said that they did not see action plans whose goals were achievable, at a time when Biden himself had warned during his visit to Tel Aviv last week that Israel must set clear goals. And a real appreciation of whether the path you take will lead to achieving those goals.

It seems that the stagnation of the situation has begun to raise many questions about Israel’s intention and the readiness of its army and its ability to achieve the ambitious goals of the war set by the political leadership, and about the realism of these goals and the possibility of achieving them at all, and how to get down from the tree of these lofty goals and rationalize them before failure to achieve these goals turns into defeat. .

In light of the dispute between Netanyahu and the army leadership and the public crisis of trust between the two parties, Netanyahu met in recent days with more than one military figure from outside the security staff managing the war, including the former chief of staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, Gallant’s rival and arch friend of Gantz.

Netanyahu also met with Reserve General Yitzhak Brik, who had previously warned that the Israeli army was not ready to fight a war, and he warns today that the ground “maneuver” is a trap that Hamas has been preparing for a decade, and that it will also shed a lot of blood of Israeli soldiers. It will lead to Hezbollah, which will enter the war, being bombarded with five thousand missiles daily and causing destruction and death parallel to the destruction and death that Israel will cause to Lebanon, in addition to attacks from the West Bank and a Palestinian uprising within the Green Line.

Yedioth Ahronoth attributed the delay of the ground operation mainly to the fact that Netanyahu was not concerned with it, and pointed out that those close to him published videos praising the effectiveness of the aerial bombardment only, as military commentator Avi Issakharov wrote that Netanyahu is doing a lot to delay the ground operation, under logical reasons. Sometimes, such as "hostages" and "international credibility", but in reality he knows that this operation will not bring him much good, in reference to the investigation committee that is waiting for him and other officials for their failure in this war.

In this context, The Marker newspaper revealed that those close to Netanyahu are behind the “secret media campaign” that is sweeping social media and aims to put a brake on the ground operation, claiming that there is a need to destroy all Hamas tunnels from the air first.

This campaign includes WhatsApp groups, a Facebook page, and extensive explanations of the campaign in which it appears that a lot of money has been invested. It lacks the signature of the responsible party, but it refers to a Facebook group that was launched last Friday, showing that the organization is An association whose members are anonymous, and after excavations and investigation carried out by the newspaper, it became clear that the person behind the campaign is a public relations office close to Netanyahu.

But although Netanyahu, as is clear, takes into account the first day after the war and attaches great importance to his political future when he postpones or disrupts the ground operation and tries to descend from the tree of lofty goals that he himself set, such as “crushing Hamas,” we know that the latter did not go. To this option in “better days” than these days, perhaps because he also realizes that this goal is also expensive and unrealistic.

To realize this, it is enough to read what Thomas Friedman wrote in the New York Times, stating that Israel’s invasion of Gaza may turn the humiliating tactical defeat that Tel Aviv suffered at the hands of Hamas into a long-term strategic moral and military crisis, indicating that it has not yet been eliminated. On any of the Islamic/jihadi movements; Because it has deep cultural, social, religious and political roots in its societies.

Source: Arab 48