Hejaz Railway Project.. Israel Concerned by Saudi-Turkish Rapprochement

Israel views the Saudi-Turkish rapprochement with clear concern. Tel Aviv does not see the agreements between Ankara and Riyadh as ordinary economic steps, nor does it treat them merely as transportation and railway projects. In materials published by Israeli newspapers in June 2026, Turkey appears as a power attempting to reorder trade, security, and political lines in the region, from the Gulf to Syria and Lebanon, and from the Eastern Mediterranean to Israel's northern borders.This interpretation began with the railway file; "Maariv" published a report on June 9, 2026, about Turkey and Saudi Arabia signing two memoranda of understanding in the fields of railways and logistics. According to the report, the two countries seek to revive and modernize the "Hejaz Railway" line, as part of a land corridor connecting Turkey to Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, with long-term plans that may extend the network towards Oman and the Indian Ocean. The report presents the project as a major shift in the trade map, especially given the tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and the risks facing maritime navigation routes.In another report in the same newspaper, the plan appeared more sensitive from an Israeli perspective. It stated that Turkey and Saudi Arabia are close to adopting a railway route through Syria and Jordan, a step that could weaken the need for the economic corridor proposed to connect India to the Middle East and Europe via Israel. That corridor relies on normalization with Saudi Arabia or its practical approval, while the Turkish-Saudi route gives Riyadh another option that does not pass through Israel.For this reason, Israeli concern goes beyond commercial competition, as the issue relates to Israel's position in regional connectivity projects. If Turkey and Saudi Arabia succeed in establishing a stable land corridor from the Gulf to Europe, Israel could lose some of the value it sought to build through international corridor projects. Tel Aviv realizes that infrastructure in the Middle East is inseparable from politics, and that a railway line can turn into a tool of influence no less important than military alliances.At the same time, Israel is also cautiously following the Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement. "Maariv" published a report on June 12, 2026, about a joint air exercise between Egypt and Turkey at several Egyptian Air Force bases. The exercise included unifying combat concepts, exchanging training expertise, and joint operational sorties. This step came after a joint naval exercise between the two sides in September 2025 under the name "Friendship Sea," which was their first naval exercise in 13 years.This maneuver is particularly important because Egypt has been a central security partner for Israel for decades, while Turkey adopts a more assertive rhetoric towards Tel Aviv. "Maariv" quoted the "Rai Al Youm" website as saying that Washington asked its diplomatic teams in Cairo and Ankara to provide clarifications about the nature of security and military contacts between the Egyptian and Turkish defense ministries. The report also pointed to increasing American and German interest in the extent of coordination between the two sides, and to initial discussions about a broader military cooperation framework that could include additional countries.In Lebanon and Syria, the picture appears broader, as Zvi Bar'el wrote in "Haaretz" on June 11, 2026, that the threats made by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan against Israel conceal a plan to formulate a new regional order led by Turkey. Bar'el believes that Erdoğan is trying to influence negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, and is pushing to link the Lebanese file to Syrian interests, so that Washington and Tel Aviv do not exclusively formulate security arrangements on the borders of Lebanon and Syria.Bar'el based his assessment on Erdoğan's speech to his party members in the Turkish parliament, when he said that Turkey's security does not begin in Hatay province, but in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut. The author interprets these words as a declaration of expanding Turkey's security sphere. According to this interpretation, Ankara does not see Syria as a separate arena, nor does it treat Lebanon as a distant file. It views both countries as part of a security and political environment in which it wants to directly influence.According to "Haaretz," Damascus fears that any agreement between Lebanon and Israel under American auspices could lead to the establishment of an Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon, which might create a precedent to be used later in Syria. It also fears that Washington might pressure it to sign a similar agreement with Israel under terms it cannot accept. Here, Syrian President Ahmed Al-Shara' is trying to establish the principle of "unity of channels," meaning preventing Lebanon from acting alone in the negotiation process with Israel. Erdoğan enters at this point to send a message to Israel and the United States that any Lebanese-Israeli agreement cannot ignore Syria or the Turkish role.All these moves are linked to a broader idea discussed by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, as reported by "Haaretz," which is the idea of "regional ownership of security." Ankara wants to build a security system based on cooperation among regional countries instead of relying entirely on the United States. Turkey benefits from a growing Gulf sentiment that American guarantees are no longer sufficient, especially with Iranian tensions and navigation threats.In this sense, the Saudi-Turkish rapprochement gives Turkey an economic entry point into the Gulf. Coordination with Egypt opens a military door for it in the Eastern Mediterranean, and its role in Syria and Lebanon gives it political space close to Israel's borders. Therefore, Tel Aviv sees these developments as an indication of a new phase, in which Ankara seeks to transform geography, railways, maneuvers, and political rhetoric into a cohesive network of influence. Israel's concern here does not stem from a single project, but from the accumulation of Turkish steps that could redefine Ankara's position in the Middle East and weaken Israel's ability to monopolize connectivity and security routes in the region.