The truth about 'Larijani's spy'.. Did the Mossad penetrate the inner circle of the Iranian official?

Social media platforms were abuzz with a wave of analyses following the circulation of tweets by David Keyes, former spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in which he hinted at a close targeting of Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. Keyes claimed in his posts that Larijani had become an imminent target, based on information he alleged came from a secret agent who had recently returned from Tehran.

The posts included a photo of Larijani during his participation in International Quds Day events in the Iranian capital, with an unidentified man appearing behind him. Keyes circled the man in red, claiming he was an 'agent' working for Israeli intelligence agencies, which raised widespread questions about the accuracy of these claims in light of current security tensions.

With the announcement of Larijani's assassination, followers recalled those tweets as supposed evidence of prior knowledge of the operation. Keyes intensified the controversy by describing the mysterious man as a 'mole,' an intelligence term referring to agents planted deep within enemy apparatuses for many years, which opened the door to theories of deep security penetration.

In contrast, media sources refuted these claims, with field reporters explaining that Keyes uses a provocative and sarcastic style in his posts. This behavior aims to create confusion and promote a stereotypical image of the Mossad's extraordinary capabilities in reaching sensitive targets deep within Iran at any time.

Sources indicated that the name Keyes circulated, 'Haba Tour,' is not a real or common name in Israeli circles, but rather a linguistic play suggesting that the target is 'the next turn.' This approach reflects a desire to wage psychological warfare against Iranian leaders and their allies in the region via social media platforms.

The Arab public's reaction to this news was divided between skeptics and believers, with some considering that publishing such information openly contradicts the secrecy of real intelligence work. Observers believed that boasting about operations before or immediately after they occur reflects Israeli arrogance aimed at demoralizing the other side.

On the other hand, analysts believed that relying on modern technology in assassinations, such as hacking cameras and phones, reduces the need for field spies next to the target. They considered that focusing on 'a man in a photo' might be merely a distraction to divert attention from the real technical means used to track and target Larijani.

Observers stressed the need for Iranian security agencies to conduct a comprehensive review of protection protocols and scrutinize the circles surrounding officials. They considered that the recurrence of such incidents, whether resulting from human or technical breaches, represents a harsh lesson about the importance of intelligence superiority in modern wars that are no longer limited to missiles.

The criticism directed at Keyes was not limited to the security aspect but also included accusations of engaging in 'political bullying' against Arabs and Iranians. The use of sarcasm in the context of assassinations reflects the Israeli right's tendency to turn security operations into material for media consumption and internal political propaganda.

The question remains about the ability of these narratives to withstand field realities, especially since Larijani did not take additional precautionary measures despite the public threats. The incident remains an example of how intelligence information intertwines with digital rumors in shaping public opinion during major crises.

This content aims to bully and imply that the Mossad is capable of penetrating everything and conveying messages through the media.