"Hamas" Between Consolidating Authority and Erosion of Legitimacy: An Analysis of the Reality in Gaza After the Ce

The recent truce in the Gaza Strip did not succeed in paving the way for a new political phase; rather, it revealed the fragility of the internal Palestinian situation and brought to the surface old practices that confirm that division remains the actual ruler of the Palestinian arena.

Since the ceasefire came into effect on October 10, it has been clear that Hamas exploited the relative calm to reorganize its security and administrative institutions and strengthen its grip on the sector, in the absence of any local forces capable of competing with or limiting its dominance.

A video showing Hamas security forces executing a group of young men from the Dagmash family in the Sabra neighborhood, under the pretext of their collaboration with the Israeli occupation and committing crimes, sparked widespread controversy in Palestinian streets. This incident was not the first; weeks earlier, security groups affiliated with the movement attacked the Al-Majayda family in the Mawasi area of Khan Younis, killing several of its members on the same charges, while Israeli airstrikes killed some members of the force.

These practices recalled Hamas's record of extrajudicial killings and the implementation of public executions during its past years of rule, which constitutes a blatant violation of human rights and legal standards that criminalize any punishment without a fair trial.

Notably, the public debate surrounding these incidents did not stem from a principled stance against extrajudicial killings, but rather from the political division itself: some defended these executions as a "deterrent to chaos and collaboration," while others condemned them based on their political rivalry with Hamas, not from a standpoint of defending the rule of law and the right to life. This, in itself, is a dangerous indicator of the erosion of legal and rights concepts in the Palestinian collective consciousness, under the pressure of division and political alignment.

The truce, which was promoted as an opportunity to rebuild national unity, has practically turned into a new phase of reinforcing the status quo in Gaza. While the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah was preoccupied with its internal files and accused of abandoning Gaza for more than a decade and a half, Hamas was restructuring its governmental institutions, appointing new officials, and imposing a strict security regime on the ground under the banner of "restoring stability."

Thus, the movement invested in the political vacuum to reproduce its authority, not to contribute to building a common national project. The absence of any serious path to end the division has left Palestinian society in a state of political disorientation: there is no real reconciliation, no unified national administration, and not even a clearly defined reconstruction project. The most dangerous aspect of this reality is that it provides Hamas with a constant justification to continue its security grip under the pretext of "maintaining internal security" in the absence of alternatives.

Violations of basic rights, from freedom of expression to the right to a fair trial, continue in Gaza under the pretext of war and chaos, reflecting a pattern that expresses the transformation of the idea of security into an end in itself, while the law is marginalized and dissenting voices are silenced.

Even youth movements and popular initiatives that previously attempted to criticize living conditions or administrative corruption faced repression and persecution.

Despite international criticisms demanding that Hamas stop field executions and acts of revenge, the movement continues to exercise power as a de facto authority, pursuing those it labels as "lawbreakers," imposing taxes and customs fees on traders, and managing its security and civil institutions as if the war had not brought about a fundamental change in the nature of governance. This indicates that the announced halt to executions was merely a political tactic to alleviate international pressure, not a genuine shift in approach.

In light of widespread destruction of judicial and justice facilities, and the absence of an institutional framework for any independent civil system, there does not seem to be a near possibility for real reform or accountability. Hamas currently rules by means of the status quo and benefits from the absence of an alternative and the weakness of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

However, the central question that arises is: Will Hamas remain in power?

The Israeli and international conditions, especially those that have re-emerged in political plans based on the "Trump Plan," aim to completely remove Hamas from the administration of Gaza, replacing it with a new civil or international administration that oversees reconstruction and ensures security for Israel.

However, the ground reality indicates that Hamas remains the only organized force capable of managing people's affairs, even at a minimum level, and any attempt to marginalize it without a real national alternative could mean a return to chaos and internal explosion.