“Based on the information I received from soldiers and officers fighting in the Gaza Strip since the start of the war, I came to the following conclusion: The IDF spokesman and military analysts on TV channels present a false picture of the thousands of Hamas deaths and of our fighting with their forces face to face.

With this preface, retired Israeli General Yitzhak Brik began an analysis in which he explained that the number of those killed among the forces of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) was much less than what was being promoted, and that most of the Israeli soldiers and officers killed fell as a result of Hamas’ bombs and anti-tank missiles.

He expressed his belief that the Israeli army does not currently have an effective and quick way to eliminate Hamas members, most of whom hide in the tunnels and only emerge from their openings to plant bombs, set up explosive traps, and fire anti-tank missiles at our armored vehicles, and then disappear again into the tunnels, as he put it.

It is clear, according to Brick, that the Israeli army spokesman and senior defense officials want to portray the war as a “great victory” before the dust of the battle settles and the true picture becomes clear.

To this end, they are bringing correspondents from major television channels to Gaza to show “pictures of victory,” making this the most photographed war ever waged by Israel, and perhaps any war waged even in the entire world, according to the retired general.

But such bragging by displaying images of victory, Brick says in his analysis in Haaretz newspaper, “Even before we get close to achieving our goals, it may be very destructive... It would have been better for us to remain more humble.”

He adds that this reminds him of what Israeli officials, including retired generals and others, used to repeat before the Al-Aqsa Flood operation on October 7, that their army is the strongest in the Middle East and that Israel’s enemies have been deterred.

“Unfortunately, these same reporters, analysts, and retired generals continue to fabricate images of this kind, as if they have learned nothing,” according to the author.

Regarding the Hamas tunnels, Brik asserts that their destruction will take many years, and will cost Israel heavy losses, noting that the Israeli army itself now acknowledges the existence of hundreds of kilometers of tunnels deep in the ground that connect the length and breadth of Gaza, and even connect this sector to the Sinai Peninsula.

The retired general stressed that the illusion of deterring Hamas was what made Israel neglect to direct its experts to study, plan and manufacture appropriate equipment for underground warfare, which is what made it today try to improvise solutions.

In this regard, many officers fighting in Gaza were quoted as saying that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to prevent Hamas from rebuilding itself, even after all the destruction that the Israeli army inflicted on its bases.

For Brick, the solution lies in leaving dense urban areas and acting more precisely, through bombing and air strikes based on accurate intelligence information. At the end of his analysis, he poses the following question: Are politicians and senior defense officials capable of dealing with such a scenario? Or are they able to think of other creative solutions, in which we do not achieve everything we want, but in which we are also not the biggest losers?