Netanyahu, who is searching for an image of victory at the gates of Gaza to end his now inevitable political future, will only reap disappointment because a number of political and military analysts estimate that Al-Qassam is serious about the slogan it inscribed on its flag: “Victory or martyrdom.”

The closer the Israeli army gets to achieving the alleged “victory” in Gaza, the “knives are sharpened,” as they say in Hebrew, for the “victors” from the leaders of the army, Shin Bet, and intelligence, all the way to their prime minister, who “slept on guard” and caused the events of October 7th. / Last October, which disrupted the Israeli security theory on which the entire Zionist colonial project is based.

This may be the first time in history that “knives were sharpened” to greet the “victors” in the war and “sticks of the gallows” were erected for them. Therefore, talking about an Israeli victory in and over Gaza, regardless of the results of the bloody war, is superfluous talk and devoid of any substance. Not only because what was broken on October 7 was a comprehensive collapse of the “iron wall” theory established by Jabotinsky, implemented by Ben-Gurion’s heirs, reinforced by Sharon, and whose fruits were reaped or almost achieved by Netanyahu.

Netanyahu, who is searching for an image of victory at the gates of Gaza to end his now inevitable political future, will apparently reap nothing but disappointment because a number of Israeli political and military analysts confirm that the Qassam Brigades are serious about the slogan they inscribed on their flag and took as the title of their battle, “Victory or Martyrdom.” Its fighters and leaders will not leave with their hands raised, but will continue to fight for months and even years after the Israeli army falls into the Palestinian mire in Gaza.

In this context, the Israeli writer B. Michael, that this time also will not be a victory. It will be “bombing,” “grinding,” “crushing,” “mashing,” and demolition, but not a victory. “We have defeated the Palestinians time after time and woke up again and again for the same day yesterday in a circle with no way out.” While the military analyst in the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper, Ron Ben Yishai, writes, “Anyone who thinks that controlling Gaza and undermining Hamas’s authority in the northern Gaza Strip will achieve the necessary goal for Israel’s security is wrong, because the southern Gaza Strip is a stand-alone problem that needs an answer.” This was confirmed by the Israeli Minister of Security, Yoav Galant, who said that long days of fighting await his army.

This is while military expectations suggest that these battles will continue, perhaps for several months to come, which perhaps prompted Netanyahu to say that Israel will maintain its security control over the Gaza Strip for a long time, while the military analyst for the newspaper “Haaretz”, Amos Harel, describes the picture of the battle as different and more More complex than it was in Operation Cast Lead, over the past 14 years, he says, Hamas has strengthened the underground system in a way that no Western army has ever encountered before, while its main forces lie in the tunnels, and its leaders show no signs of being ready to surrender.

Harel says that in the absence of Hamas’s military ability to curb the advance of an Israeli armored force with large numbers of vehicles and enormous firepower; Its fighters in the tunnels attack these forces after they are positioned at fixed points.

In the absence of clear military objectives, too, the Israeli army began to focus and announce the numbers of deaths among Palestinian resistance fighters, a phenomenon that Harel considers problematic. It distinguished the American army during the Vietnam War, and it became prominent in Israel, as military affairs expert Yigil Levy says, during the Intifada. The second, and especially intensified after the case of the killer soldier, Elior Azaria, and the criticism directed at the Israeli army as a “vegetarian army,” which prompted General Eisenkot to boast before his retirement of killing 171 Palestinians in the West Bank, within two years, and culminated in the era of General Kochavi, who spoke In his coronation speech about a "killer army."

Levy believes that the use of killing turns into a goal in itself when it cannot be justified as a means of achieving goals. Therefore, he believes that this speech may be a kind of preparation of the ground for a situation in which American pressure leads to stopping the war before Hamas’s authority is undermined, where the army can then show progress. The blame is placed on politicians, he says.

The American army also followed this method in Iraq in order to justify its losses there by suggesting that the enemy is suffering greater losses, and it is not unlikely that such a discourse is developing here as well, to justify the losses of the Israeli army and to silence the voices that may demand not to continue sacrificing the lives of soldiers, as Levy says. Especially since the scenes of destruction in Gaza are no longer convincing and the majority of Gazans killed are civilians, and in the absence of clear goals that can be measured by achieving them, the number of enemy fighters killed may be a reassuring factor, at least temporarily, especially in light of the absence of a critical public that can He wonders why we kill and are killed?, he says.