Political Islam and the Nation-State: Between Structural Problematic and System Responsibility

Amidst the renewed debate surrounding the position of Islamist currents in public life, the discussion about the Muslim Brotherhood stands out as the most sensitive and divisive. Between those who view it as an existential threat to the nation-state and those who place it within the context of political pluralism, a gray area emerges that requires a deeper and more candid reading, far from both idealization and absolute demonization. The rise of this current cannot be understood without returning to the historical context in which it was formed, especially during the Cold War era, when Arab regimes, to varying degrees, allowed the growth of Islamist movements as a counterweight to their ideological adversaries. In this context, the group gained a margin for social and organizational work, at a time when other political forces were being dismantled or marginalized. This historical paradox not only granted Islamists a space for presence but also contributed to reshaping social consciousness, where the religious intertwined with the political, and the missionary with the ideological. However, this expansion was not without cost. The intellectual structure upon which the group was founded, since its establishment by Hassan al-Banna, stems from a vision that transcends the boundaries of the nation-state, viewing the "Ummah" (global Muslim community) as a higher and more comprehensive framework. This vision, despite its validity in a religious-civilizational context, practically clashes with the concept of the modern state based on sovereignty, borders, and equal citizenship. Here, the first structural problematic emerges: Is the state a final goal or a stage within a broader project? In practice, the group did not provide a decisive answer; instead, a dual discourse often appeared: a flexible political language that recognized the state and its institutions, contrasted by an organizational and intellectual structure that maintained different priorities. This duality was not merely a detail but became one of the reasons for the loss of trust, both from the state and from segments of society. Pluralism, in the view of many critics of the group, seemed closer to a temporary tactic than to a principled commitment, especially when the group approached positions of influence or power. As for citizenship, the group's discourse witnessed a relative evolution, but it remained governed by a religious reference that raised questions about full equality among citizens. When "doctrinal identity" is part of the political structure, it becomes difficult to achieve state neutrality towards all its components. However, the most dangerous dimension in testing these problematics clearly manifested in the Palestinian case, where political competition transformed into a structural division that struck the political system at its core. The events of the 2007 Palestinian division constituted a pivotal turning point when the dispute between national forces and the political Islamist current escalated to the level of field control, accompanied by the disintegration of the unity of political and institutional decision-making. This division was not merely an internal dispute but opened the door for direct and indirect investments by Israel, which found in it an opportunity to deepen the geographical and political separation between the West Bank and Gaza, and weaken the Palestinian position in international forums. Regional polarization axes also fueled this division, making the Palestinian arena part of broader conflicts, at the expense of the unity of the national cause. The result was catastrophic on several levels: erosion of the political system's legitimacy, weakening of the national project, exhaustion of society, and deepening of people's suffering under occupation and division simultaneously. Here, the danger of prioritizing the ideological project over the requirements of national unity becomes clear when "political difference" turns into "political separation." Nevertheless, holding this current alone fully responsible, despite the validity of a large part of the criticism, may overlook other factors related to the structure of the Palestinian political system itself and the nature of its management of internal conflict. But what cannot be ignored is that introducing a closed ideological dimension into a national liberation arena, which inherently requires the broadest degrees of unity, was a decisive factor in deepening the crisis. Jordan, by virtue of its geopolitical specificity and social composition, stands before this experience as a living lesson. The challenge lies not only in managing the relationship with the Islamist current but in avoiding reaching a moment where internal balance breaks down. Any imbalance in this balance—whether through complete exclusion or uncontrolled empowerment—could open the door to unforeseen possibilities. In conclusion: Yes, the Islamist current, and foremost among them the Muslim Brotherhood, has real intellectual and organizational problems in reconciling its ideological project with the requirements of the modern nation-state. The Palestinian experience, especially after the 2007 division, showed how political disagreement, when managed with a closed mindset, can turn into a division that weakens everyone and gives the adversary an opportunity to advance. But the most important truth, which should be clear to everyone, is that the state does not weaken due to only one current, but rather weakens when fair and clear rules that govern everyone without exception are absent. When any current—Islamist or otherwise—feels that it can operate outside the law, or above the state, chaos begins. And when the citizen feels that the state does not represent them equally, or that it favors one party over another, trust erodes, and the rift within society widens. In both cases, the result is the same: internal division, general weakness, and opening the door to external interventions and exploitation. Therefore, the solution does not lie in replacing one current with another, nor in excluding one party in favor of another, because exclusion does not end crises but postpones them and makes them more complex. The real solution lies in building a state with clear rules, felt by every citizen, and based on three fundamental pillars: that the law is above all, so no group, party, or individual is stronger than the state; that citizenship is equal, so people are not discriminated against based on ideology, religion, or affiliation; and that political pluralism is managed within a peaceful, organized framework governed by the constitution, not the logic of open conflict. When these rules are achieved, any political current—no matter its ideology—will be forced to operate within the state's boundaries, unable to impose its vision on society, or monopolize truth or power. In simpler words: a strong, just state does not fear any current, but all currents must submit to a strong, just state. Only then can society be protected, national unity preserved, and the painful experiences witnessed in our region prevented from recurring.