How America Lost the Arab World

By Said Arikat

April 8, 2026

News Analysis — Washington, D.C.

In an article published in Foreign Affairs on April 7, 2026, Amaney A. Jamal, Dean of the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, and Michael Robbins, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, argue that the reverberations of Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel have penetrated nearly every layer of Middle Eastern society. The human and material toll has been immense: tens of thousands killed—predominantly in Gaza—millions displaced, and infrastructure losses in the billions. Within this context, the authors contend that the sweeping shift in regional public opinion is both profound and unsurprising.

Their central claim is that the United States has suffered a deep—and potentially enduring—erosion of its standing across the Arab world. This decline stems largely from Washington’s role in recent regional conflicts, particularly the war in Gaza and the subsequent war on Iran. Drawing on Arab Barometer surveys conducted between late 2023 and late 2025, Jamal and Robbins show that public attitudes across the Middle East and North Africa have turned sharply against the United States and, to a lesser extent, its European allies.

The turning point was Hamas’s October 7 attack and Israel’s devastating military response. The scale of destruction in Gaza decisively shaped public perceptions. Across the region, many attributed responsibility not only to Israel but also to the United States, widely viewed as its principal backer. This perception has proven durable, with subsequent polling indicating that distrust of Washington is now deeply entrenched.

Equally striking is the geopolitical reorientation reflected in these attitudes. Where the United States once exercised considerable influence, Arab publics increasingly view alternative powers—especially China and Russia, and in some cases Iran—more favorably. Respondents often associate these actors with defending freedoms, supporting Palestinian rights, and contributing to regional stability. This shift does not reflect ideological alignment with these states’ systems but rather growing disillusionment with the United States, seen as inconsistent and selectively committed to international law.

These perceptions have been reinforced by the escalation involving Iran. Israeli military actions extending into Lebanon and affecting Gulf states have intensified views of American complicity in regional instability. At the same time, the slow pace of Gaza’s reconstruction has deepened frustration. In many contexts, anti-American sentiment now appears even stronger than in the immediate aftermath of the Gaza war.

The political implications are substantial. Although many Arab governments are authoritarian, they remain sensitive to public opinion and the risk of unrest. As hostility toward the United States rises, overt cooperation with Washington becomes increasingly costly. Jamal and Robbins warn that absent a meaningful policy shift—particularly de-escalation with Iran and renewed efforts toward a just resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—the United States risks losing not only public goodwill but also strategic partnerships.

Survey data underscores the depth of this reputational crisis. Approval of U.S. foreign policy is exceptionally low across most countries, with only small minorities expressing favorable views. In several cases, current U.S. leadership is viewed more negatively than previous administrations. While exceptions exist—such as Morocco and Syria, where specific policies have generated limited goodwill—the broader trend remains overwhelmingly adverse.

European countries fare somewhat better but are still viewed critically, largely in relation to their positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Spain and Ireland, perceived as more supportive of Palestinian rights, receive relatively favorable evaluations, whereas Germany’s strong alignment with Israel has diminished its standing.

By contrast, China enjoys the highest favorability ratings across much of the region, and Russia often outperforms the United States. Iran’s image is more ambivalent: while many remain wary of its regional ambitions and nuclear program, its opposition to Israel has enhanced its appeal. Even figures such as former Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei have seen improved perceptions, reflecting a broader “enemy of my enemy” dynamic.

At the center of these attitudes lies the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Large majorities across the Arab world view the United States as fundamentally biased toward Israel. This perception extends to international institutions, with many respondents also regarding the United Nations as partial. Disillusionment therefore encompasses not only U.S. policy but the broader international order, increasingly seen as inequitable and ineffective.

Despite widespread hostility toward Israel, Arab public opinion is not entirely rigid. Surveys indicate conditional openness to normalization if Israel recognizes a Palestinian state, alongside continued support for a two-state solution. However, ongoing Israeli policies—particularly settlement expansion in the West Bank—are widely viewed as undermining that prospect, reinforcing anger toward Israel and its allies.

Perhaps most consequential for the United States is the erosion of its perceived legitimacy as a defender of international law and human rights. In multiple countries, more respondents identify China—not the United States—as the actor most committed to upholding international norms. Similarly, when asked which country better protects freedoms or contributes to regional security, China consistently outperforms Washington. These perceptions reflect not admiration for China’s system but dissatisfaction with what is widely seen as American inconsistency and double standards.

The broader implication is a potential geopolitical realignment. As public opinion shifts, Arab governments may increasingly diversify their partnerships, strengthening ties with China and Russia while reducing reliance on the United States. In some cases, this process is already underway, with states exploring alternative alliances or limiting visible cooperation with Washington. Ongoing tensions involving Iran may accelerate this trend.

Yet, the authors note, this outcome is not inevitable. The United States and its European partners retain the capacity to rebuild credibility, but doing so will require substantive policy adjustments. France’s improved standing following its recognition of a Palestinian state illustrates how even symbolic actions can influence public opinion.

Ultimately, according to the authors, restoring trust will require aligning policy with principle. For the United States, this means de-escalating regional conflicts, addressing Gaza’s humanitarian crisis, and actively supporting a just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. More broadly, it demands a consistent commitment to international law and human rights. Absent such changes, the United States risks a lasting loss of influence in the Arab world, ceding both moral authority and strategic ground to competing global powers.