Solid Institutional Building Is Not a Luxury, But a Unique Form of Resistance

In the course of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, there have been historical moments when the possibility of transitioning to a different political reality seemed closer than it does today. Among the most prominent of these moments was the period following the Oslo Accords, when the Palestinian National Authority was formed as a political and administrative framework that could gradually evolve into the nucleus for building the institutions of a Palestinian state capable of organizing society and enhancing its steadfastness. This phase was a historical opportunity to strengthen the Palestinian presence at a time when conditions were favorable, and relations with Israel were better than they are today. The rule of law and good governance could have become tools to connect society with institutions, ensuring legitimate and clear representation for the Palestinian majority.

This moment was not solely a result of Palestinian dynamics; it also stemmed from transformations within the political society in Israel, particularly the rise of what was known as the peace camp within the Israeli Labor Party, led by figures such as Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. This movement gambled on the idea that a Palestinian authority capable of managing its society within a clear institutional framework could form the basis for a long-term political settlement, providing the Israeli peace camp with a strong argument to continue with the settlement project.

The gamble was based on the idea that Palestinians, by building strong institutions and establishing the rule of law, would present a model of a society capable of unifying internal positions and regulating the public sphere. The rule of law was meant to unite society with the institution, keeping opposition within legal frameworks without deviating from the institutional path, which would prevent any individual actor or group from altering the Authority's approach to dealing with the occupation. This meant that any individual initiative, or a small field event such as a child throwing a stone, would not be able to overturn the balance of the political process or negotiations.

However, the absence of a clear central vision and decision-making, coupled with weak institutional building, made this gamble fragile. The Palestinian public sphere remained open to multiple initiatives and political centers, leading to the erosion of internal and external trust in the Authority's ability to commit to an organized negotiation process. This also contributed to the rise of more hardline right-wing currents within Israel, threatening any peace project based on institutional betting.

The experience of Oslo and the Palestinian Authority clearly shows that weak institutions not only weaken Palestinian society but also weaken the trust of the other party in the Palestinian partner, making the field more susceptible to daily fluctuations and field crises. Under occupation, specifically, solid institutional building becomes not a luxury, but a unique form of resistance. A society that possesses strong institutions and clear laws is more capable of steadfastness and organizing public life, preventing the occupation from exploiting any internal weakness, whether through political tug-of-war or scattered individual initiatives.

Even in the event of a more hardline Israeli right-wing camp rising, the existence of strong Palestinian institutions would have changed the nature of the confrontation. A society that is institutionally and socially cohesive becomes more resilient, making it difficult for any external party to bet on penetrating or dismantling it. Strong institutions give society the ability to effectively manage the public sphere, unify political decisions, and establish the rules of the political game, so that opposition remains within the framework of the law and individual initiatives are managed in a way that does not threaten institutional unity.

This experience offers a clear lesson: institutional building does not guarantee peace or settlement, but it provides society with long-term tools of strength. Strong institutions not only enhance the ability to negotiate but also provide the ability to withstand internal and external pressures, allowing Palestinians to maintain their cohesion and unity of decision, whether in the settlement phase or in the face of escalating conflict. Furthermore, effective institutions reflect an image of an organized Palestinian entity, capable of representing the entire society, which enhances the legitimacy of decisions and makes it difficult for the occupation to exploit vacuum or divisions.

In this sense, thinking about the Oslo period and the Palestinian Authority is not just about lost political opportunities, but about the internal strength that could have been achieved, and what could have made Palestinian society more resilient, more capable of facing difficult transformations, and achieving a clear institutional political presence in the face of occupation. The most prominent lesson is that societies that succeed in building solid institutions become more capable of facing transformations, whether they lead towards settlement or conflict, and institutions transform from an administrative tool into a backbone of actual resistance.