Why shouldn't we get drawn into the "day after" debate now?

It draws attention to the exaggeration of the United States, Europe, and some circles and Israel in their attempts to divert the controversy surrounding the crimes of the occupation in Gaza, into a discussion about what they call “arrangements for the next day,” like someone seeking to sell a bear skin before hunting it.

The focus of the discussion on the next day, instead of the current day, generally aims to try to reap the fruits of the Israeli military aggression politically, because this discussion is based on the hypothesis of Israel’s success in achieving its goals from the war it declared against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, and its need for political arrangements that guarantee Preserving these supposed and hoped-for military gains.

The specific goal is to help Israel get out of the mud it will find itself in “the next day,” whether in terms of the military attrition expected to continue, or the civil, administrative, and moral responsibility that will cost it dearly.

Israel's predicament is that achieving its declared goals in its war requires a kind of continuous reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which Israel is trying to avoid for the same reasons that prompted it to withdraw from it nearly twenty years ago. Therefore, Israel finds itself in need of someone to help it and partner with it. In preserving the achievements that it assumes will be achieved in this war, through the type of political, security and administrative arrangements at a stage after the end of this confrontation.

In this regard, Netanyahu’s disagreement with the United States over “the next day” is not fundamental but rather formal. On the one hand, he insists on the continuation of Israeli military activity in the Gaza Strip after the end of the war, and he does not mind the presence of a party (Arab or Palestinian, provided that it is not the Authority). Israel accepts it and manages the civil and services sector, and there is no doubt that this is inspired by the functional division model that Israel imposed in the West Bank, where it reserves security responsibility for itself, and leaves the burden of civil and administrative responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority.

This is not at all different from the American position, which is looking for a party (preferably the Palestinian Authority) to manage the affairs of the Gaza Strip after the war, and they will have no objection if Israel continues its security role there.

Abstaining from participating in the “Next Day” discussion, or playing a role in it by the Palestinians and Arabs, would place Israel and the United States before one of two options, both bitter. The first is for Israel to pay the price for its ill-advised adventure through continued involvement in the occupation of the Gaza Strip, and to bear The military, administrative, moral and legal responsibilities for this, and the second option is to withdraw from Gaza unilaterally and without any joint arrangements regarding the “next day”, considering that an internal Palestinian matter that is being discussed and arranged by Palestinians and Arabs after the Israeli withdrawal and in light of that.

Another reason why the Palestinians and Arabs should not be drawn into the “the next day” discussion with the United States and its protégé, Israel, is that this discussion will be a cause for more division and internal Palestinian disagreement to no avail, in addition to requiring those who participate in it to respect Palestinian and Arab public opinion, which sees in such matters This discussion is a kind of backstabbing.

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Israel's dilemma is that achieving its declared goals in its war requires a kind of continuous reoccupation of the Gaza Strip, which Israel is trying to avoid for the same reasons that prompted it to withdraw from it nearly twenty years ago.