After the ceasefire in Gaza... the consequences of the next phase

Barring a sudden development, a temporary ceasefire agreement in Gaza is expected to be reached in the next few days. President Trump may announce this agreement during Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to the United States yesterday (I wrote these lines prior to the visit). If this is announced, all eyes will be on the "day after" scenarios over the next 60 days and beyond, as the Israeli government, supported by the US administration, seeks political achievements that translate the results of the genocidal war and transform the Gaza Strip into a hostile, uninhabitable area. A political effort will be made to complete what daily massacres, starvation, deprivation of water, and collective punishment in all its forms have failed to achieve.

It is well known that negotiations either succeed, remain negotiations for the sake of negotiations, or fail, leaving things as they are. If they succeed, they usually reflect the facts on the ground and the balance of power. The outcomes of negotiations are not determined solely by the competence or weakness of the negotiator, despite the importance of this. A weak negotiator may lose more than necessary and not achieve what could be achieved. A competent negotiator may improve the negotiating conditions, but it is usually impossible to achieve (essentially) the opposite of what is on the ground. Based on this, the first step must be an accurate reading of reality to determine what is possible and what is impossible.

Since the Israeli occupation forces invaded Lebanon (1982), the “New Middle East” began to take shape.

A realistic reading of the current situation, 21 months after the Al-Aqsa Intifada, despite the legendary steadfastness and valiant resistance, indicates the weakness of the Palestinian negotiating position. This is evident in the scale of destruction and death, the occupation of two-thirds of the Gaza Strip, the persistence and deepening of the division, the absence of a clear Palestinian vision, the impasse of leadership, institutions, and programs without opening a new path, Arab impotence, which sometimes amounts to complicity, and international contradictions. On the one hand, the international community (despite its theoretical support for Palestinian rights) stands helpless in taking action, despite the massive and unprecedented popular solidarity with Palestine and the condemnation of Israel, even in international courts and institutions and from the West, including within the United States and Europe. This has prompted European countries to adopt unprecedented punitive stances and measures against Israel.

On the other hand, the parties of the axis of resistance, including Iran, suffered heavy blows despite their steadfastness in the war. However, they launched harsh missile strikes against vital targets throughout Israel, preventing Washington and Tel Aviv from achieving their goals: destroying the nuclear and missile programs, toppling the regime, forcing it to submit, or causing internal strife. This is evidenced by the widespread support for the regime. However, the cessation of the war was not accompanied by an agreement; rather, it was merely a ceasefire, and the issues that preceded it remain unresolved. This means that the war has not been resolved, and that each side has achieved points that allow it to claim victory. The region and the world have witnessed unresolved wars before, such as the Korean War in the 1950s, which has yet to yield a peace agreement, or the Iraq War, the first of which ended with the expulsion of Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait in 1991, followed by the second, which ended with the overthrow of the regime in 2003.

The October War (1973) was not decided militarily, but rather politically, years after Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977, and the signing of the peace agreement after that (1979), with which Egypt regained Sinai within restrictions, and emerged from the conflict and war, which left the Arab parties (including the Palestinian party) exposed, so the occupation forces invaded Lebanon in 1982, and since that date the “New Middle East” began to take shape, which is a long-term historical process, advancing at times and retreating at other times.

Despite its achievements, strengths and superiority, and the fact that it is a functional entity serving a global colonial project led by the United States, Israel is confronted with the reality that its expansionist ambitions and its pursuit of regional hegemony are greater than its capabilities to achieve them. It is a small, sparsely populated country that suffers from many internal weaknesses and contradictions. It is a foreign body planted in the Arab region and cannot be absorbed unless its colonial-settler nature and functional role change. It is also confronted with the presence of more than seven million Palestinians in their homeland, Palestine, who are not prepared to leave or become slaves, and are determined to persevere and continue the struggle to achieve their goals.

Accordingly, the region is likely headed toward one of the following scenarios: either the continuation of the status quo without a settlement between Iran and Israel; or a settlement in which each side achieves some of its demands, or Iran is subjugated through soft means, over a period of years; or a new war erupts to achieve what was not achieved in the 12-day war; or the continuation of the policy of "battles between wars." However, what has become clear is that a kind of "balance of deterrence" has been achieved, halting the American-Israeli momentum, temporarily or permanently. This depends on the course of regional and international events in the coming years, whether toward redrawing the map of the Middle East, dominated by Israel, or establishing some kind of regional and international pluralism and balance.

The worst thing for Israel would be the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza, with internal Palestinian consensus and Arab and international support. Moreover, Arab states, particularly the Gulf states, must act as if they are in a better negotiating position than they were before the war. If Iran were defeated, Israel would be more aggressive toward everyone, even those who have normalized relations with it, and would be more capable of advancing toward the liquidation of the Palestinian cause in all its components.

As for Israel, after 21 months of war, Tel Aviv has not achieved its objectives despite its military achievements. Even in Syria, where the regime has completely changed and been replaced by a regime hostile to Iran, it is unlikely that the new regime will conclude a peace treaty with Israel, as it lacks the power or legitimacy to undertake such major steps. Rather, the most it could offer is a security truce agreement.

In Lebanon, there are no signs of normalization or disarmament for Hezbollah, but rather options are open, including a return to war. The relative decline in security threats may allow the Saudi leadership to maintain its position: no normalization without the establishment of a Palestinian state, something the current Israeli government is unlikely to agree to.

Likud's chances appear to be increasing in the upcoming elections, given an opposition not significantly different in its extremism, united by a shared goal: to oust Netanyahu without adopting an alternative vision. This makes a Netanyahu victory a plausible scenario.

In this context, it will not be possible to achieve major accomplishments on other tracks, so Israel will focus on achieving political gains on the Palestinian track. While it realizes (or will realize sooner or later) the difficulty of achieving maximum goals, such as the complete occupation of Gaza and the imposition of military rule, or displacement, annexation, and the liquidation of the Palestinian cause, while keeping the door open to these possibilities, it will descend from the tree and attempt to achieve minimum goals, such as the annexation of parts of the West Bank and maintaining security control in Gaza, particularly through control of the buffer zones and strategic axes, especially along the Egyptian-Palestinian border and those linking the occupying state to the Gaza Strip.

It will also seek to deal with Gaza as it does with the West Bank and Lebanon: continuing the siege, bombing, assassinations, and incursions, pushing the situation towards chaos and internal fighting, without entering into a direct occupation that would be costly to the occupation army's forces, and without endangering the lives of Israeli detainees. It should be noted that it has not achieved its goals, despite the Israeli army's exhaustion of what it could achieve, according to its leaders, who prefer an interim agreement that would pave the way for ending the war.

It is expected that we will witness (especially if the exchange agreement is concluded and does not fail) the implementation of intensive attempts to overthrow Hamas's rule, disarm it and the resistance, and expel its remaining leaders from the Strip. However, the main Israeli weakness, which limits (if not prevents) the achievement of its goals, is the absence of a political alternative to Hamas in Gaza. The far-right government is unwilling (or unable) to bear the cost of direct occupation and the imposition of military rule, and has failed to find local elements to assume governance. Yasser Abu Shabab's militia will collapse if the occupation forces redeploy their forces. Therefore, Netanyahu demanded the establishment of tent cities in Rafah, the displacement of residents from the north to the south, and the maintenance of Israeli control in several important areas, because the agent militias cannot operate or survive except under direct Israeli protection. Its bet on families and clans has also failed. Israel does not agree to the return of the Authority, and it still refuses to place Gaza under Arab or Arab-international guardianship, because the countries nominated to participate, or at least most of them, do not accept this, as it would provide cover for the continuation of the occupation or Israeli security control.

A kind of "balance of deterrence" would be achieved, and if Iran were defeated, Israel would be more aggressive toward everyone.

The Netanyahu government fears that it will ultimately find itself forced to accept Hamas remaining in the Gaza Strip, whether in power or outside it, but with the ability to influence and control. If it continues to reject the return of the authority or Arab guardianship, it may find itself facing this reality. Therefore, it must prepare for a scenario of renewed war after the 60-day period ends, or after its extension. This will be difficult due to the emergence of an internal Israeli-Palestinian, regional and international momentum, especially American, which will not help in resuming the war, at least in the form it was.

The worst-case scenario for Israel is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza within the framework of internal Palestinian consensus and international Arab support, as this embodies Palestinian national identity in a single entity and keeps the door to a Palestinian state open.

This scenario must be acted upon by Palestinians, by every loyal, patriotic Palestinian who wants to protect the cause, the land, and the people, and by every Palestinian who does not want to surrender and become an agent of the occupation. The “renewed” authority, which the occupying state can agree to, is the one that accepts to be a cover for the Israeli solution, whether in the form of a decisive plan, or a plan derived from theories of conflict management and reduction, which could be adopted by a new Israeli government with a different coalition headed by Netanyahu or someone else. It does not differ from its predecessor except in that it is trying to achieve what can be achieved by Israel now, because achieving a complete resolution of the conflict is not possible, neither now nor in the future.

This threat is exacerbated by an international push, led by Saudi Arabia and France, to hold an international conference to establish a Palestinian state before the end of this year, as a condition for regional stability, cooperation, and peace.

While this move faces Israeli rejection, backed by Washington, if Netanyahu's extremist government falls and a government led by Naftali Bennett takes over, adopting an approach of "conflict management and mitigation" rather than "resolution," we could return to the stage of conflict management without a solution, or a narrow window could open for a "settlement" between the Palestinian, Arab, and international positions, and the Israeli-American position.